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REMOVAL JURISDICTION OVER MASS ACTIONS
Mallory A. Gitt
Abstract: The mass action provision in the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 provides a
federal forum for certain state court litigation that resembles class actions but otherwise
could not be removed. The provision is triggered when state court plaintiffs propose a joint
trial of common legal or factual issues. But defining what constitutes that triggering event
has proved difficult for federal courts. They have not used a uniform framework to determine
when they have subject matter jurisdiction over the purported mass action, and have lacked a
common interpretation of the statutory language to begin the inquiry. That lack of coherence
has created confusion for litigants and potentially upset the balance of power between federal
and state courts. This Comment proposes a uniform framework for federal courts to use in
construing their subject matter jurisdiction in mass action cases.

INTRODUCTION
Mass actions exist because Congress did not trust state courts to
properly adjudicate aggregate litigation.1 Mass actions were not a formal
kind of litigation before Congress passed the Class Action Fairness Act
of 2005 2 (“CAFA”), but were created to stanch the tide of abusive class
action litigation—at least in Congress’ view. 3 Legislation was necessary
because, according to Congress, an out-of-control system of class action
litigation had led to unfair results 4 and large payouts to greedy plaintiffs’
attorneys. 5 State courts in particular kept “cases of national importance
out of Federal court” 6 by applying their governing class action rules
“inconsistently” and “inadequate[ly] supervis[ing]” 7 aggregate litigation.
And stringent diversity jurisdiction rules further kept many defendants
from removing such suits to federal court. 8 Through CAFA, Congress
gave defendants a new avenue by which to federalize state court
1. Aggregate litigation “encompass[es] the various procedural techniques used to litigate civil
claims on a mass or collective basis in such a way as to yield preclusion.” RICHARD A. NAGAREDA
ET AL., THE LAW OF CLASS ACTIONS AND OTHER AGGREGATE LITIGATION 25 (2d ed. 2013).
2. See generally Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4.
3. S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 46 (2005).
4. Id. at 4.
5. Id.
6. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 119 Stat. at 5.
7. S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 4.
8. See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 119 Stat. at 5; S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 5.
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litigation. Defendants could now remove state litigation that merely
resembled a class action.
A mass action is a different procedural device than a class action. 9
However, the mass action device aggregates litigation so that it generally
operates the same way as a class action.10 A mass action is formed when
plaintiffs bring together—or, in the words of the statute, propose a joint
trial of common issues of fact or law11—state court suits. 12 The joined
suits must also meet CAFA’s other jurisdictional requirements,
including numerosity and amount in controversy. 13 When plaintiffs
make a “proposal,” the defendant may remove the suits as one
consolidated suit to federal court. 14 It has been unclear, however, what is
a proposal and how—if at all—federal courts should interpret the effects
of the “proposal” the plaintiffs have made when the courts determine
whether they have subject matter jurisdiction.15
Despite the contention that mass actions would be a rarely used
procedure, 16 the mass action provision has become the subject of intense
litigation. 17 As that litigation has wended its way through the courts,
defining the contours of the mass action provision has been a
challenging process. One court described the mass action provisions as
“an opaque, baroque maze of interlocking cross-references that defy
easy interpretation.” 18 Another called the provisions a “Gordian knot.” 19
Still another stated simply, “CAFA as a whole, and the mass action
provision in particular, is confusing.” 20
For their part, litigants—both plaintiffs and defendants—are litigating
9. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11) (2012), with FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
10. However, mass actions are not subject to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure—namely Rule
23—that govern class actions. See Rudy Perrino, How CAFA Expands Federal Jurisdiction to
Include Certain Mass Actions, in THE CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT: LAW AND STRATEGY 202
(Gregory C. Cook ed., 2013).
11. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11) (2012).
12. See id.
13. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d).
14. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11).
15. See, e.g., Parson v. Johnson & Johnson, 749 F.3d 879, 885 (10th Cir. 2014); In re Abbott
Labs., Inc., 698 F.3d 568, 570 (7th Cir. 2012); Tanoh v. Dow Chem. Co., 561 F.3d 945, 952 (9th
Cir. 2009).
16. See, e.g., 2 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN ET AL., NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 6:24 (5th ed.
2013) [hereinafter NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS].
17. See, e.g., Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 736 (2014);
Corber v. Xanodyne Pharm., Inc., 771 F.3d 1218 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc).
18. Lowery v. Ala. Power Co., 483 F.3d 1184, 1198 (11th Cir. 2007).
19. Lowery v. Honeywell Intern., Inc., 460 F. Supp. 2d 1288, 1293 (N.D. Ala. 2006).
20. Cooper v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 586 F. Supp. 2d 1312, 1314 (M.D. Fla. 2008).
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to test the boundaries of federal court jurisdiction over mass actions.
Plaintiffs have attempted to keep their suits in state court by structuring
them to avoid CAFA’s federal jurisdiction triggers. 21 Defendants have
removed to federal court on novel theories. For example, they have
argued that the number of real parties in interest meets the 100-plaintiff
threshold that CAFA requires 22 and that a bellwether trial is in effect a
“joint trial.” 23 In 2013, the Supreme Court decided Standard Fire
Insurance Co. v. Knowles, 24 which demonstrates the gamesmanship
CAFA in general has engendered. A class action plaintiff in state court
stipulated that the putative class would not seek damages above
$5 million. 25 In doing so, he sought to avoid CAFA’s $5 million
amount-in-controversy threshold. 26 The district court found that
damages would have exceeded that amount but for the putative class
member’s stipulation, but that because damages were below the
threshold, there could be no federal court jurisdiction over the action. 27
The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that a plaintiff could not stipulate
to any limit on the amount of damages it would pursue when there was a
putative class because there was no class yet that could be legally
bound. 28 Thus, the contours of CAFA jurisdiction—including under the
mass action provision—are still being worked out in the federal courts.
It is against this backdrop that this Comment takes up CAFA’s less
well-understood mass action provision. Litigants have zeroed in on what
constitutes a proposal for a joint trial of common legal and factual issues

21. See, e.g., In re Abbott Labs., Inc., 698 F.3d 568, 572 (7th Cir. 2012) (describing plaintiffs’
argument that using a bellwether trial would serve only to coordinate the cases for pre-trial
purposes, not to fully adjudicate the issues and thereby circumvent federal court jurisdiction under
CAFA).
Note that plaintiffs’ attempts to avoid CAFA jurisdiction are consistent with the more general
concept of forum-shopping, which occurs at the outset of every suit when the plaintiff chooses the
initial forum. See Antony L. Ryan, Principles of Forum Selection, 103 W. VA. L. REV. 167, 168–69
(2000) (“The plaintiff’s privilege [of forum selection] is so ingrained in our jurisprudence, and so
rarely challenged on its own terms, that it is seldom discussed.”). What is particularly interesting
about the CAFA context is that courts and litigants are adjudicating what kind of gamesmanship is
permissible under this relatively new statute.
22. See, e.g., AU Optronics Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 739 (deciding whether parens patriae suits by
definition meet CAFA’s mass action requirements).
23. In re Abbott Labs., Inc., 698 F.3d at 572–73.
24. Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Knowles, __ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 1345 (2013).
25. Id. at 1347.
26. Id. at 1347, 1350.
27. Id. at 1348.
28. Id. at 1348–50.
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in the last several years, 29 and thus when a federal court has jurisdiction
over a mass action. But the questions raised by the mass action provision
do not only concern procedural matters. The questions also implicate
fundamental values in our judicial system: the boundaries of power
between the state and federal courts; 30 the relationship between
plaintiffs, who are the masters of their complaints; 31 and the rights of
defendants, who may have a statutory right to have their cases heard in
federal court. 32
This Comment addresses two fundamental problems that have
emerged when federal courts have construed their jurisdiction under
CAFA’s mass action provision: (1) that there is no coherent
interpretation of what it means to propose that multiple cases “be tried
jointly on the ground that the plaintiffs’ claims involve common
questions of law or fact,” 33 and (2) that there is no principled framework
for analyzing subject matter jurisdiction in a mass action case. Because
the federal courts have not been consistent, there have been real
consequences for litigants, as well as for the balance of power between
state and federal courts. Thus, this Comment proposes solutions to both
of these problems. This Comment builds on existing case law to put
forth a coherent definition for what constitutes a proposal for a joint
trial—the part of the mass action provision subject to much debate. 34 It
then proposes a framework for federal courts to determine their subject
matter jurisdiction when faced with a purported mass action.
Parts I through III provide necessary background to the interpretive
issues that have arisen in mass action cases in federal court. Part I briefly
traces the history of class action adjudication, discussing the limits that
the Supreme Court imposed on the device in the late 1990s. 35 Part II
29. See, e.g., Parson v. Johnson & Johnson, 749 F.3d 879, 885 (10th Cir. 2014); In re Abbott
Labs., Inc., 698 F.3d 568, 570 (7th Cir. 2012); Tanoh v. Dow Chem. Co., 561 U.S. 945, 952 (9th
Cir. 2009).
30. Federalism is defined as “[t]he legal relationship and distribution of power between the
national and regional governments within a federal system of government.” BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 687 (9th ed. 2009).
31. See Holmes Grp., Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 831 (2002)
(“[P]laintiff is ‘the master of the complaint . . . .’” (quoting Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 483 U.S.
386, 398–99 (1987))).
32. See 13 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3641 (3d ed.
2008) (discussing how a defendant may statutorily remove a case from state court to federal court,
even though the state court is the plaintiff’s preferred forum).
33. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(1) (2012).
34. See, e.g., Parson, 749 F.3d at 887–89 (construing the statute’s joint proposal language); In re
Abbott Labs., Inc., 698 F.3d at 572–73 (same); Tanoh, 561 U.S. at 953 (same).
35. See generally, e.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997); Ortiz v.
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then addresses why litigation that merely resembled a class action
became a political target and what Congress sought to achieve in passing
CAFA. It particularly focuses on Congress’ view of state courts in the
run-up to CAFA’s passage and why that led Congress to include mass
actions in the statute. It also discusses at length CAFA’s mass action
provision. 36 Part III discusses underlying assumptions of federal court
subject matter jurisdiction, including the federal courts’ willingness to
go beyond pleadings and investigate their jurisdiction, 37 using fraudulent
joinder as an example. This Part provides useful context for
understanding how some federal courts have deviated in the mass action
context from their standard approach to construing subject matter
jurisdiction.
Part IV reconciles the primary mass action decisions in the federal
courts, concluding that the courts have developed two interpretive
approaches: one that facilitates an expansive grant of federal court
jurisdiction in mass action cases, and one that facilitates a narrow grant
of jurisdiction. The approach that a court uses is important because it
determines as a threshold matter whether a group of state court cases is a
mass action and thus whether a federal forum is available to the litigants.
This Part argues that neither approach is completely reconcilable with
how federal courts interpret their diversity jurisdiction in other contexts,
and argues that bringing coherence to this area of law would benefit both
litigants and courts. It concludes by asserting that the Supreme Court’s
recent decision in Mississippi ex rel Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., 38
although it squarely addresses CAFA’s mass action provision, does not
much affect mass action litigation beyond parens patriae 39 suits.
Part V proposes a framework that the federal courts should employ in
construing their subject matter jurisdiction in mass action cases. It
argues that this framework is contemplated by CAFA itself, and, in any
case, adheres to traditional principles in subject matter jurisdiction
doctrine and affords due deference to state courts. It calls for federal
courts—on their own motion if necessary—to require factual evidence
of removal jurisdiction if the parties themselves do not provide it, and

Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999).
36. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11).
37. See, e.g., In re Avandia Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 07-md-1871, MDL
No. 1871, 2014 WL 2011597, at *1 (E.D. Penn. May 15, 2014).
38. Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics, __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 736, 741 (2014).
39. Parens patriae is a “doctrine by which a government has standing to prosecute a lawsuit on
behalf of a citizen, esp. on behalf of someone who is under a legal disability to prosecute the suit.”
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1221 (9th ed. 2009).
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the evidence is not apparent from the face of the parties’ pleadings that
the federal court lacks jurisdiction. When assessing the factual evidence,
the federal court should give the same effect to the underlying state court
procedural motion that the state court would because existing CAFA
case law supports it and federalism requires it. This Comment further
grounds the proposed approach in traditional judicial principles in the
subject matter jurisdiction context.
I.

CAFA: CLASS AND MASS ACTIONS

CAFA’s mass action provision concerns the federal courts’ ability to
hear state court suits. 40 But this jurisdictional question is not just about
the courts’ power. Rather, it is animated by the seemingly unfair results
that arise from using class action-like litigation to solve large-scale
problems. 41 This Part discusses the development of class actions in
federal courts before turning to CAFA and the new procedural mass
action device that the statute created. The historical background provides
context for understanding why litigation that resembled class actions—
what became known as “mass actions”—became a political target.
A.

Class Actions in Federal Court

In a legal system premised on individual rights, 42 class actions, and
litigation that produces similar effects, are an anomaly. They are an
exception to the principle “that one is not bound by a judgment in
personam in a litigation in which he is not designated as a party or to
which he has not been made a party by service of process.”43 The law

40. CAFA is a jurisdictional statute. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d).
41. See, e.g., discussion of Amchem and Ortiz infra in Part I.A.
42. See, e.g., Tatsuo Inoue, The Poverty of Rights-Blind Communality: Looking Through the
Window of Japan, 1993 BYU L. REV. 517, 521 (1993) (“Individual liberties and freedoms have
become the over-arching concern of the American legal system.”); Frank J. Macchiarola, Finding
the Truth in an American Criminal Trial: Some Observations, 5 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. LAW
97, 111 (1997) (noting “[t]he tendency of our American legal system to see rights in . . . individual
terms”); David M. Rabban, Free Speech in Progressive Social Thought, 74 TEX. L. REV. 951, 980
(1996) (discussing First Amendment legal philosophy in the context of the “American legal system”
and its “constitutional system of individual rights”).
43. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940); see also Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 884
(2008) (quoting Hansberry for proposition that “[i]t is a principle of general application in Anglo–
American jurisprudence that one is not bound by a judgment in personam in a litigation in which he
is not designated as a party or to which he has not been made a party by service of process”); Ortiz
v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 818 (1999) (citing Hansberry for the same proposition);
Richards v. Jefferson Cnty., Ala., 517 U.S. 793, 795 (1996) (“In Hansberry v. Lee, we held that it
would violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to bind litigants to a judgment
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therefore “treats class actions as justified only in limited
circumstances.” 44 It does so with good reason because class actions
create a number of tensions: between named and unnamed class
members; 45 between class members and class counsel; 46 and between
courts and litigants. 47
The 1966 makeover of Rule 23 48 expanded the scope of class actions
and made them readily available to plaintiffs seeking monetary
damages. 49 When the Rules Committee promulgated the new rule,
commentators noted that class action devices were ill-suited to solving
complex problems like those that arise in mass tort suits. 50 Despite this
seeming limit, class action use expanded throughout the late 1960s and
1970s as parties employed class actions to litigate consumer products
liability cases and other mass torts. 51 As the device evolved, class
actions and aggregate litigation more generally were employed in a
rendered in an earlier litigation to which they were not parties and in which they were not
adequately represented.” (internal citation omitted)); 1 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS, supra note
16, § 1.1 (quoting Hansberry for the proposition that “one is not bound by a judgment in personam
in a litigation in which he has not been made a party by service of process”).
44. GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., ET AL., PLEADING AND PROCEDURE 795 (10th ed. 2009).
45. See 2 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS, supra note 16, § 9.1 (describing the expectation that an
absent class member will sit back and do nothing, while the named party represents the interests of
the entire class). Indeed, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(4) requires as a prerequisite that the
representative parties fairly and adequately represent the class. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4) (“(a) One or
more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all members only
if: . . . (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.”).
46. Class counsel may collude with the represented parties or the defendant, for example, in a
way that undermines the unnamed class members’ interests. See, e.g., In re Bluetooth Headset Prod.
Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d 935, 938 (9th Cir. 2011) (noting that class counsel would have received
$800,000 in putative class settlement, while unnamed parties would have received nothing and
defendants would have contributed only $100,000 under the cy pres doctrine to a newly created
charity).
47. The court is tasked with protecting the interests of the unnamed class members, which may
put it at odds with the litigants who may prefer a different outcome, for example, a universal
settlement sought by both the named parties and the defendant. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 810 (1985) (“Unlike a defendant in a civil suit, a class-action plaintiff is not
required to fend for himself. The court and named plaintiffs protect his interests.” (emphasis added)
(internal citation omitted))).
48. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory’s committee’s note to 1966 amendment.
49. Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 357–58 (1967); Scott L. Nelson, CAFA in the
Congress: The Eight-Year Struggle, in THE CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT: LAW AND STRATEGY,
supra note 10, at 24.
50. David Marcus, Erie, the Class Action Fairness Act, and Some Federalism Implications of
Diversity Jurisdiction, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1247, 1252 (2007).
51. David Marcus, The History of the Modern Class Action, Part I: Sturm Und Drang 1953–
1980, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 587, 609–14 (2013).
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range of cases never contemplated. 52 Indeed, aggregate litigation became
a regulatory tool when captured government agencies 53 would not or
could not act, 54 particularly in consumer protection, securities, antitrust,
and employment discrimination cases. 55 As it did, the tensions inherent
in aggregate litigation intensified and led to congressional and executive
attempts to rewrite and cabin Rule 23 throughout the 1970s. 56 Business
lobbyists weighed in during this time, arguing that class actions were a
“grave economic hazard to business,” 57 which foreshadowed later
arguments in the lead-up to CAFA’s passage. 58 These efforts were
largely unsuccessful, however, and class action law occupied an almost
extra-regulatory space throughout this period. 59
But in the late 1990s, in two class action settlement cases, the
Supreme Court first signaled that there were significant concerns with
expansively using class action litigation. 60 A class action settlement “is a
judicially crafted procedure” 61 and “is intended not to litigate contested
issues but to implement a settlement.” 62 And usually the parties “agree
to settle . . . before the class certification decision is made.” 63 In the late
1990s, the Supreme Court determined that the mass tort settlements that
came before it in Amchem Products v. Windsor 64 and Ortiz v.
52. See id. at 592–94.
53. Capture of a regulatory agency “occurs when a regulator becomes too closely connected with
the industry that is to be regulated.” CCH International Encyclopaedia of Laws: Cyber Law § 2,
2013 WL 4296521 (C.C.H.) (2012).
54. Marcus, supra note 51, at 592–93.
55. Id. at 627–39.
56. Id. at 611–12.
57. Id. (quoting Hearings on S. 2246, S. 3092, S. 3201 Before the Consumer Subcomm. of the S.
Comm. on Commerce, 91st Cong., 2d. Sess. iii (1970)).
58. See Nelson, supra note 49, at 40–42.
59. See Marcus, supra note 51, at 610–12.
60. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 620–21, 627 (1997) (“[S]pecifications of
[Rule 23]—those designed to protect absentees by blocking unwarranted or overbroad class
definitions demand undiluted, even heightened, attention in the settlement context. Such attention is
of vital importance, for a court asked to certify a settlement class will lack the opportunity, present
when a case is litigated, to adjust the class, informed by the proceedings as they unfold.”); Ortiz v.
Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 821 (1999) (“We hold that applicants for contested certification on
[a FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(B)] rationale must show that the fund is limited by more than the
agreement of the parties, and has been allocated to claimants belonging within the class by a process
addressing any conflicting interests of class members.”).
61. In re GMC Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 778 (3d Cir. 1995).
62. JAY TIDMARSH, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MASS TORT SETTLEMENT CLASS ACTIONS: FIVE CASE
STUDIES 19 (1998).
63. Id. at 20.
64. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 629.
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Fibreboard Corp. 65 violated due process principles. In both cases, the
plaintiff classes sought to remedy a nationwide problem that Congress
had not acted to fix—millions of people who had developed asbestosrelated injuries during their careers. 66 The settlements that came before
the Court were the culmination of decades of litigation: “plaintiffs’
lawyers” had “honed the litigation of asbestos claims to the point of
almost mechanical regularity.” 67 But the proposed mass settlements
troubled the Court because they did not provide an adequate recovery to
many people affected by asbestos. 68 The procedural devices were not
adequately constructed to provide sufficient relief and to protect absent
class members. 69
In Amchem, a plaintiff class sought settlement certification to
“achieve global settlement of current and future asbestos-related
claims.” 70 It contained a “complex agreement designed to compensate
certain types of asbestos injuries in a predictable fashion.” 71 The
Supreme Court, however, was concerned the settlement did not
adequately compensate the plaintiff class. 72 The class would have been
bound by the settlement forever, while the defendants could withdraw
after ten years. 73 And only a small number of class members could reject
the settlement and pursue individual claims; even these plaintiffs,
however, could not recover punitive damages. 74 In addition, the funding
mechanism for the settlement did not account for inflation or for costs of

65. Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 865.
66. See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 597 (“The settlement-class certification we confront evolved in
response to an asbestos-litigation crisis.”); Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 821 (“Like Amchem Products, Inc. v.
Windsor, this case is a class action prompted by the elephantine mass of asbestos cases . . . .”
(internal citation omitted)).
67. Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 822.
68. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 627 (“The settling parties, in sum, achieved a global compromise with
no structural assurance of fair and adequate representation for the diverse groups and individuals
affected.”); Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 842 (“[T]he greater the leniency in departing from the historical
limited fund model, the greater the likelihood of abuse.”).
69. See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 627 (“[T]he terms of the settlement reflect essential allocation
decisions designed to confine compensation and to limit defendants’ liability.”); Ortiz, 527 U.S. at
842 (“[T]he greater the leniency in departing from the historical limited fund model, the greater the
likelihood of abuse . . . .”).
70. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 597.
71. TIDMARSH, supra note 62, at 51.
72. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 604 (“Class members are to receive no compensation for certain kinds
of claims, even if otherwise applicable state law recognizes such claims.”).
73. Id. at 604–05 (“Class members, in the main, are bound by the settlement in perpetuity,
while . . . defendants may choose to withdraw from the settlement after ten years.”).
74. Id. at 627 (describing how “only a few claimants per year can opt out at the back end”).
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advancing medical treatment. 75 Although the Court rejected the
settlement because of these concerns, it noted, “the text of the Rule does
not categorically exclude mass tort cases from class certification.” 76 It
did, however, establish that there were significant hurdles to overcome
before certification for settlement purposes. 77
Similarly, in Ortiz, the parties sought to certify a class-wide
settlement as a Rule 23(b)(1)(B) limited fund 78 to deal with “the
elephantine mass of asbestos cases.” 79 The Court held that the parties
could not show that the proposed fund was actually limited by the
company’s financial circumstances, rather than merely by what the
company was willing to pay to settle the claims. 80 The Court also found
that the parties had not shown that the class members would be treated
equitably in the distribution of the fund. 81 These deficiencies meant the
settlement could not proceed and, more importantly, raised questions
about whether the device could ever be used to settle similar claims. 82
This pair of cases emphatically shows that by the late 1990s there
were limits to the problems aggregate litigation could be used to solve. 83

75. Id. at 626 (“[N]amed parties with diverse medical conditions sought to act on behalf of a
single giant class rather than on behalf of discrete subclasses. In significant respects, the interests of
those within the single class are not aligned.”).
76. Id. at 625.
77. The hurdles include ensuring adequate provision for future claimants who might have latent
diseases or perhaps allowing class members bound by the settlement to seek relief in court later in
some instances, for example. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 620–21, 627.
78. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 821 (1999); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(B) (“A
class action may be maintained if Rule 23(a) is satisfied and if: (1) prosecuting separate actions by
or against individual class members would create a risk of: (B) adjudications with respect to
individual class members that, as a practical matter, would be dispositive of the interests of the other
members not parties to the individual adjudications or would substantially impair or impede their
ability to protect their interests.”).
79. Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 821.
80. Id. at 860 (“With Fibreboard retaining nearly all its net worth, it hardly appears that such a
regime is the best that can be provided for class members.”).
81. Id. at 848 (“[The proposed settlement] showed . . . allocations of assets at odds with the
concept of limited fund treatment and the structural protections of Rule 23(a) explained in
Amchem.”).
82. Id. at 821 (“We hold that applicants for contested certification on [a FED. R. CIV. P.
23(b)(1)(B)] rationale must show that the fund is limited by more than the agreement of the parties,
and has been allocated to claimants belonging within the class by a process addressing any
conflicting interests of class members.”).
83. At the time Amchem was being decided, the Standing Committee of the Rules of Practice and
Procedure had proposed that Rule 23 be changed to “allow[] certification of settlement classes more
easily than litigation classes.” HAZARD ET AL., supra note 44, at 879. But given the Court’s
decisions in Amchem and Ortiz, the proposed rule change died in the Committee. Id. (“The
Proposed Rule died in the wake of Amchem and Ortiz.”).
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In both cases, the Court found that the litigation “defie[d] customary
judicial administration and call[ed] for national legislation,” 84 even
though Congress had failed to act after over thirty years of asbestosrelated litigation. 85 When Congress also addressed class action reform
during this time, the judiciary had signaled its own discomfort with
aggregate litigation.
B.

Congress Turns to Class Action (and Class Action-Like) Litigation

As the Supreme Court placed limits on settlements in class action
practice in the mid- to late-1990s, Congress also targeted class action
(and class action-like) litigation more generally. In the infamous Bank of
Boston suit in the mid-1990s, at least one member of a class action
settlement was charged a $91.33 “miscellaneous deduction” for attorney
fees from his escrow account without his knowledge in exchange for a
$2.19 recovery as a member of the class. 86 Class counsel received
$8.5 million in costs and fees. 87 An Alabama state court judge approved
the settlement. 88 The case demonstrated what many people already
thought of class actions: that they were egregiously unfair to both
plaintiffs and defendants. 89 Class counsel earned a windfall at the
84. Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 821.
85. Id. (noting that the first suit for “personal asbestos injury” was filed in federal court in 1967).
86. See Barry Meier, Math of a Class-Action Suit: ‘Winning’ $2.19 Costs $91.33, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 21, 1995, at D6; Kamilewicz v. Bank of Bos. Corp., 100 F.3d 1348 (7th Cir. 1996) (underlying
suit at issue). The absent class members in the original suit who had recovered little or had to pay
out-of-pocket more than their recovery was worth, filed their own class action, alleging that the
earlier suit had led to fraud. Meier, supra, at D6.
87. Meier, supra note 86, at D6.
88. Id.
89. See, e.g., Robert Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 729, 731
(2013) (“The class action device, once considered a ‘revolutionary’ vehicle for achieving mass
justice, has fallen into disfavor. Numerous courts have become skeptical about certifying class
actions. Some have emphasized the pressures on defendants to settle after class certification is
granted . . . .”); Alexandra Lahav, Fundamental Principles for Class Action Governance, 37 IND. L.
REV. 65, 76 (2003) (noting the “occasional instances of egregious corruption on the part of
attorneys who take advantage of class members and a perception that consumer class actions are not
a public good, but a money making scheme for unscrupulous lawyers”); Francis E. McGovern,
Class Actions and Social Issue Torts in the Gulf South, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1655, 1659 (2000) (“[T]he
combination of a proplaintiff environment with ample actionable torts and the advent of
entrepreneurial litigation in the hands of a well-funded, risk-taking plaintiffs’ bar have combined to
create a favorable class action chemistry in the Gulf South.”). But see Willy E. Rice, Allegedly
“Biased,” “Intimidating,” and “Incompetent” State Court Judges and the Questionable Removal of
State Law Class Actions to Purportedly “Impartial” and “Competent” Federal Courts—A
Historical Perspective and an Empirical Analysis of Class Action Dispositions in Federal and State
Courts: 1925–2011, 3 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 419, 458 (2012) (“[A]buse of judicial discretion
is arguably the most egregious risk that defendants will face when defending against class
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expense of unsuspecting class members, and provided little benefit to the
class members. 90 This case in particular contributed to a political
environment hostile to aggregate litigation. 91
1.

Congress Introduces CAFA

Congress first introduced CAFA in 1997. 92 Because the bill was
spurred in part by the Bank of Boston case, 93 the original bill was
concerned primarily with class action settlements, and its proposed
changes would have altered at the margins the processes for adjudicating
those settlements. 94 Legislation was necessary because, according to
Congress, an out-of-control system of class action litigation had led to
unfair results for unnamed parties, 95 significant and unwarranted
financial loss for defendants, 96 and large payouts to greedy plaintiffs’
attorneys. 97 Class actions caused “irreparable injury” and “collusive”
settlements, 98 and they “failed to benefit class members while enriching
attorneys.” 99
Members of Congress believed that state courts had enabled the
problem. After the 1966 enactment of Rule 23, class action litigation
expanded in state courts 100 as those courts followed the spirit of the new,
expansive federal rule.101 In doing so, state courts kept “cases of national
importance out of Federal court,” showed “bias against out-of-State
defendants,” and made “judgments that impose[d] their view of the law
on other States and [bound] the rights of the residents of those States.” 102
State courts also applied their governing rules “inconsistently” and

actions.”).
90. See, e.g., Daniel Fisher, Study Shows Consumer Class-Action Lawyers Earn Millions, Clients
Little, FORBES (Dec. 11, 2013, 8:46 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2013/12/11/
with-consumer-class-actions-lawyers-are-mostly-paid-to-do-nothing/.
91. See Nelson, supra note 49, at 27.
92. Id. at 26.
93. Id. at 27.
94. Id. (“[T]his earliest iteration of CAFA was limited in scope and contained none of the
jurisdictional provisions that eventually became CAFA’s primary legislative battleground.”).
95. See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4, 5.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Nelson, supra note 49, at 33 (quoting H. REP. NO. 105-702, at 6 (1998)).
99. Id. at 40.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 24.
102. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 119 Stat. at 5.
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“inadequate[ly] supervis[ed]” 103 class actions. Some states had become
“magnet jurisdictions,” where plaintiffs and their attorneys flocked for
favorable class action treatment. 104
In addition to the favorable environment state courts created for
plaintiffs, stringent diversity jurisdiction rules kept many suits in state
court. 105 “[P]laintiffs who wished to avoid removal to a federal
court . . . had only to choose at least one named class representative who
was a citizen of the same state as a defendant, or add one defendant that
was a citizen of the same state as the named class representatives.” 106
These suits would then stay in state court where they were more likely to
be certified 107 and result in a plaintiff-friendly (and plaintiff attorneyfriendly) outcome. 108
The 1997 version of CAFA did not contain any jurisdictional
provision. 109 But, in short order, members of Congress sought largerscale reform of class actions. By 1998, “the idea of expanding federal
jurisdiction over class actions had already obtained at least a measure of
bipartisan support.” 110 The jurisdictional changes gained further traction
as Congress came to specifically view states as enabling abusive class
action litigation. 111
CAFA’s supporters wanted class actions litigated in a forum that
would be more skeptical of frivolous claims and more reluctant to certify
consumer classes than state courts were. 112 Interest groups in particular
urged Congress to limit the state courts’ use of aggregate litigation for
these reasons. For example, the Manhattan Institute, a research group

103. S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 5 (2005).
104. Id.
105. Before CAFA, litigants in federal court had to demonstrate complete diversity. See Cameron
Fredman, Plaintiffs’ Paradise Lost: Diversity of Citizenship and Amount in Controversy Under the
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 39 LOY. L.A. L. REV., 1025, 1031 (2006). Complete diversity
was difficult to meet in such cases because “jurisdiction-defeating tactics [we]re generally
effective.” Id.
106. Nelson, supra note 49, at 25.
107. S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 5.
108. Id. at 13.
109. Nelson, supra note 49, at 27.
110. Id. at 28.
111. Id. at 29–57 (detailing the eight-year evolution of CAFA in Congress prior to its passage).
112. See, e.g., John H. Beisner & Jessica Davidson Miller, They’re Making A Federal Case Out
of It . . . In State Court, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 143, 145–46 (2001); AM. TORT REFORM
ASS’N, BRINGING JUSTICE TO JUDICIAL HELLHOLES 2002 (2002), available at
[hereinafter
JUDICIAL
www.judicialhellholes.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/JH2002.pdf
HELLHOLES 2002].
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that promotes “economic choice and individual responsibility,” 113
commissioned a 2001 article calling for federalization of certain state
court litigation, based on the experiences of three counties in Florida,
Illinois, and Texas. 114 The article boldly claimed that state court judges
more often sided with plaintiffs because they received reelection
contributions from members of the local bar. 115
The American Tort Reform Association also joined in with its own
report—Bringing Justice to Judicial Hellholes 2002. 116 A “judicial
hellhole” was a jurisdiction perceived as favorable to plaintiffs, and
therefore “attract[ed] lawsuits from around the nation.” 117 It relied on
incendiary anecdotes from trial lawyers and state court judges in making
its case that state courts unfairly certified and adjudicated class
actions. 118 It quoted one trial lawyer as saying that certain jurisdictions
were “magic jurisdictions” “where what happens in court is irrelevant
because the jury will return a verdict in favor of the plaintiff.” 119 In its
2003 update to this report, the Association quoted a West Virginia State
Supreme Court Justice as saying, “As long as I am allowed to
redistribute wealth from out-of-state companies to injured in-state
plaintiffs, I shall continue to do so. Not only is my sleep enhanced when
I give someone else’s money away, but so is my job security.”120 The
United States Chamber of Commerce also urged Congress to reform
class actions several times from when CAFA was introduced until it was
passed. 121 The pressure from interest groups helped CAFA’s primary

113. About Manhattan Institute, MANHATTAN INST., http://www.manhattan-institute.org/about/
(last visited Oct. 28, 2014).
114. Beisner & Miller, supra note 112, at 159.
115. Id. at 205.
116. JUDICIAL HELLHOLES 2002, supra note 112. A similar report has been published every year
since 2002. See Report Archives, JUDICIAL HELLHOLES, http://www.judicialhellholes.org/archives/
(last visited Dec. 28, 2014).
117. JUDICIAL HELLHOLES 2002, supra note 112, at 2.
118. Id. at 3–5.
119. Id. at 3.
120. AM. TORT REFORM ASS’N, BRINGING JUSTICE TO JUDICIAL HELLHOLES 2003, at ix (2003),
available at www.judicialhellholes.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/JH2003.pdf.
121. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Chamber of Commerce Endorses
House
Action
on
Class
Action
Reform
(Sept.
22,
1999),
available
at
www.instituteforlegalreform.com/resource/chamber-of-commerce-endorses-house-action-on-classaction-reform/; Press Release, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Chamber Applauds Sen. Lincoln’s CoSponsorship of Class Action Bill (Apr. 10, 2003), available at www.instituteforlegalreform.com/
resource/chamber-applauds-sen-lincolns-co-sponsorship-of-class-action-bill/; Gretchen Morgenson
& Glen Justice, Taking Care of Business, His Way, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2005, at BU1 (mentioning
the president and CEO of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s role in CAFA’s passage).
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supporters in Congress to push for its passage with expanded federal
jurisdiction.
Mass actions were added to CAFA to address state court abuses of
class action-like litigation. 122 They were not part of the earliest versions
of CAFA, only appearing in the proposed legislation in 2001. 123 At that
point, mass actions were styled as “private attorney-general actions in
which individuals seek relief on behalf of others.” 124 Commentators note
that “Congress’ intent [in including the mass action provision] appears to
have been to bring under CAFA large actions in states that do not have
specific class action statutes.” 125 The Senate Committee Report stated
that neither Mississippi nor West Virginia at the time had “rules or
statutes authorizing class actions.” 126
With these two drastic additions—expanded jurisdiction and the
federalization of state court suits that may have the same effect as class
action suits—detractors of aggregate litigation were poised to enact
sweeping change.
2.

Congress Passes CAFA

After attempting to legislate class action reform for eight years in a
row, 127 Congress passed CAFA in 2005. 128 The statute provided an
avenue for more state court suits of “national importance” 129 to be
adjudicated in federal court. 130 It did so by greatly relaxing the
requirements for original diversity jurisdiction131 and removal from state
court to federal court. 132
In giving federal courts control over more aggregate litigation,

122. S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 5 (2005). Some argue, however, that many state court practices that
were abusive of the class action device had already been reformed by the time CAFA passed. See
Sue-Yun Ahn, CAFA, Choice-of-Law, and the Problem of Legal Maturity in Nationwide Class
Actions, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 105, 116 (2007) (“Whether from external pressure or internal reform, by
the time CAFA was enacted, many of the more egregious examples of class action abuse in state
courts had been addressed to some extent by the states themselves.” (footnote omitted)).
123. Nelson, supra note 49, at 42.
124. Id. (footnote omitted).
125. 2 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS, supra note 16, § 6:24.
126. S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 13–14.
127. Nelson, supra note 49, at 23.
128. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2012).
129. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4, 5.
130. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11) (2012).
131. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d).
132. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1441.

15 - Gitt_ Final Author Review_Approved 03.19.15.docx (Do Not Delete)

468

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

4/13/2015 11:57 AM

[Vol. 90:453

Congress had three primary goals: “[1] to assure fair and prompt
recoveries for class members with legitimate claims; [2] to restore the
intent of the Framers by expanding federal jurisdiction over inter-state
class actions; and [3] to benefit society by encouraging innovation and
lowering consumer prices.” 133 To accomplish these goals, CAFA
expanded federal jurisdiction over class actions, as well as mass
actions—a new kind of device encompassing litigation not previously
subject to federal court jurisdiction. 134
The statute fundamentally changed how diversity jurisdiction
operates. Before CAFA, the party seeking federal jurisdiction in a
diversity class action (whether a named plaintiff or a removing
defendant) had to establish a claim for each plaintiff in excess of
$75,000 and the existence of complete diversity among all parties.135
These previous requirements created a high barrier for entering federal
court. Under CAFA, however, a class action may be adjudicated in
federal court if the parties are minimally diverse, 136 the amount in
controversy is in excess of $5 million when all claims are aggregated,137
and there are 100 or more plaintiffs. 138
In addition, a defendant seeking to remove a case from state to federal
court is not subject to the usual—more strict—rules of removal. 139
CAFA relaxes the traditional removal rules 140 for aggregate litigation in
four key ways: (1) it removes a suit from being subject to the one-year
limitation in the general removal statute; 141 (2) it requires only one
defendant to agree to removal; 142 (3) it allows a defendant to appeal a

133. S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 30 (2005).
134. See, e.g., Mississippi. ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 736, 744
(2014) (describing the mass action’s role in the CAFA statutory scheme as a “backstop” that aids in
effectuating Congress’ “overriding concern” with class actions).
135. See 2 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS, supra note 16, § 6:6 (“The general rule for class
actions is th[at] each class member’s claim must independently meet the amount in controversy
requirement. This makes it difficult to maintain diversity class actions in federal court as class
action cases are typically comprised of small claims.”).
136. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)(A)–(C) (2012). Minimal diversity only requires that one plaintiff and
one defendant are diverse from each other, see 2 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS, supra note 16,
§ 6:6, in contrast to complete diversity, which in the class action context had required that every
class representative be diverse from every defendant, see id. § 6:7.
137. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2).
138. Id. § 1332(d)(5)(B).
139. See, e.g., 2 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS, supra note 16, § 6:15.
140. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441.
141. Id. § 1453(b).
142. Id.

15 - Gitt_ Final Author Review_Approved 03.19.15.docx (Do Not Delete)

2015]

4/13/2015 11:57 AM

REMOVAL JURISDICTION OVER MASS ACTIONS

469

remand order; 143 and (4) it allows a defendant to remove even if he is a
citizen of the state in which the case was filed. 144 The new rules
dramatically skew jurisdiction in favor of federal courts, enabling the
forum perceived to be more cautious about certifying and adjudicating
class actions 145 to take the reins.
Federal court doors, therefore, have been thrown wide open to
aggregate litigation that operates like class actions. And, as a result,
“class actions are now more regularly filed in Federal court and
defendants can now more easily remove” mass actions “from State to
Federal court.” 146 After CAFA’s passage, even its detractors in Congress
agree the statute has been successful in achieving its primary aim:
“Seven years later, CAFA certainly appears to have achieved its core
goal of removing class [and mass] actions from State to Federal
courts.” 147
II.

MASS ACTIONS: “CLASS ACTIONS IN DISGUISE”

CAFA also envelops state court litigation that otherwise would not be
subject to federal court jurisdiction by creating a “backstop” 148—the
mass action provision. This backstop ensures that state court suits that
may have the same effect as class actions cannot easily escape federal
court jurisdiction. That is because “mass actions are simply class actions
in disguise” 149 and thus “often result in the same abuses as class
actions.” 150

143. Id. § 1453(c).
144. Id. § 1453(b).
145. S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 5 (2005) (“Because interstate class actions typically involve more
people, more money, and more interstate commerce ramifications than any other type of lawsuit, the
Committee firmly believes that such cases properly belong in federal court.”).
146. Class Actions Seven Years After the Class Action Fairness Act, Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 2 (2012) (statement of
Rep. Franks, Chairman, Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary).
147. Id. at 3 (statement of Rep. Nadler, Ranking Member, Subcomm. on the Constitution of the
H. Comm. on the Judiciary).
148. See Mississippi. ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 736, 744 (2014)
(describing the mass action provision as a “backstop” that prevents litigation that resembles a class
action from escaping federal court jurisdiction).
149. S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 47.
150. Id. at 46–47.
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Creating a Mass Action

Mass actions simply did not exist before CAFA 151 because their
underlying substance is rooted in state court procedure. A mass action
starts out in state court as multiple suits that involve the same subject
matter. 152 Sometimes the same attorneys represent different groups of
plaintiffs that eventually end up coming together in the mass action.
Similarly, the multiple suits are often against the same defendant. In
state court, the plaintiffs or the court may move to consolidate the cases
for various purposes before and during trial. At this point—when a state
procedural mechanism joins the actions—they may become a mass
action (assuming the suit meets CAFA’s other statutory provisions,
described infra in Part II.A.). Unlike class actions, mass actions need not
have been initiated as representative suits and are not subject to the
rigorous requirements of Rule 23 once removed to federal court. 153 Thus,
mass actions are unique because they are wholly created from federal
statute.
Under the mass action provisions, CAFA allows a defendant to
remove state court suits that involve 100 or more plaintiffs’ claims for
monetary relief when the plaintiffs propose that the cases be tried
jointly. 154 In addition to a proposal for joint trial that brings together at
least 100 plaintiffs, 155 every plaintiff in a mass action must have a claim
in excess of $75,000, 156 and the amount of the claims as a whole must be
151. See, e.g., Gregory C. Cook & Jocelyn D. Larkin, Introduction and Overview, in THE CLASS
ACTION FAIRNESS ACT: LAW & STRATEGY, supra note 10, at 11 (calling mass actions “the new
vehicle” for aggregate adjudication).
152. See, e.g., Parson v. Johnson & Johnson, 749 F.3d 879, 885 (10th Cir. 2014) (“The
controversy before us began when 702 plaintiffs from 26 different states and the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico filed twelve nearly identical product liability actions against the defendants in the
District Court of Pottawatomie County, Oklahoma.”); In re Abbott Labs., Inc., 698 F.3d 568, 570
(7th Cir. 2012) (“Between August 2010 and November 2011 several hundred plaintiffs filed ten
lawsuits in Illinois state court . . . .”).
153. Perrino, supra note 10, at 202.
154. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11) (2012).
155. Id.
156. See, e.g., AU Optronics Corp. v. South Carolina, 699 U.S. 385, 390 (4th Cir. 2012); Lowery
v. Ala. Power Co., 483 F.3d 1184, 1203–05 (11th Cir. 2007); Abrego Abrego v. Dow Chem. Co.,
443 F.3d 676, 678 (9th Cir. 2006). CAFA’s mass action provision thus preserves one of the
elements of pre-CAFA diversity jurisdiction—that each plaintiff must have an amount in
controversy in excess of $75,000. For CAFA class actions, the amount in controversy is calculated
solely by aggregation and no attention is paid to an individual plaintiff’s amount in controversy.
Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(6) (“In any class action, the claims of the individual class members
shall be aggregated to determine whether the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of
$5,000,000, exclusive of interest and costs.”), with id. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i) (stating that “jurisdiction
shall exist only over those plaintiffs whose claims in a mass action satisfy the jurisdictional amount
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in excess of $5 million. 157 CAFA also states that mass actions are
defined as class actions for the purposes of removal, 158 so the relaxed
requirements for removal also apply to mass actions. 159
Although the mass action provisions’ requirements may seem
straightforward, they are not. In particular, the requirement that plaintiffs
propose a joint trial has created thorny interpretive challenges.160 Thus,
this Comment explores infra the proposal as a triggering event that may
confer federal court jurisdiction.
B.

Mass Confusion

Federal courts have been unclear about how they will interpret the
mass action provision when they construe their subject matter
jurisdiction. Congress directed that CAFA’s principles, including those
embodied in the mass action section, should be given broad expanse:
“[T]he definition of ‘class action’ is to be interpreted liberally. Its
application should not be confined solely to lawsuits that are labeled
‘class actions’ . . . . Generally speaking, lawsuits that resemble a
purported class action should be considered class actions for the purpose
of applying these provisions.” 161 Given that the Senate Report
accompanying CAFA states that mass actions should be defined as class
actions are elsewhere in the statute,162 Congress presumably intended
federal courts to also apply this broad interpretation to mass actions.
However, these broad statements leave open many questions, especially
because they call for interpreting jurisdiction in a way at odds with how
federal courts typically interpret their subject matter jurisdiction. Thus,
the battle over the full extent of mass action jurisdiction has been trained
requirements under subsection (a),” which requires an individual to demonstrate an amount in
controversy in excess of $75,000).
157. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(6).
158. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(A).
159. Id.
160. See, e.g., Parson v. Johnson & Johnson, 749 F.3d 879, 886 (10th Cir. 2014)
(“[Defendants] . . . contended that jurisdiction was available under CAFA’s ‘mass action’ provision
because . . . plaintiffs had proposed a joint trial of claims involving more than 100 plaintiffs.”);
Corber v. Xanodyne Pharm., Inc., 771 F.3d 1218, 1222 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (“The parties
dispute only whether Plaintiffs’ petitions for coordination constitute proposals for the cases ‘to be
tried jointly’ under CAFA.”); In re Abbott Labs., Inc., 698 F.3d 568, 570 (7th Cir. 2012) (“The
parties petition us to resolve two conflicting district court decisions and decide whether a motion to
consolidate and transfer related state court cases to one circuit court through trial constitutes a
proposal to try the cases jointly . . . .”).
161. S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 35 (2005).
162. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(A).
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on whether plaintiffs should be able to “game” the system by structuring
state court suits to avoid federal jurisdiction.163
Neither side has it quite right. Plaintiffs are not entitled in all respects
to plead around federal court jurisdiction 164 nor are defendants in all
respects entitled to invoke a federal forum. 165 The proper balance,
however, is still in flux as different federal courts mark the boundaries
differently. 166
Therefore, federal courts have struggled with interpreting the mass
action provision, particularly in determining whether plaintiffs have
proposed a joint trial and therefore created a mass action. Courts have
used colorful language to illustrate their difficulty with this task. One
court described the mass action provisions as “an opaque, baroque maze
of interlocking cross-references that defy easy interpretation.” 167
Another called the provisions a “Gordian knot.” 168 Still another stated
simply, “CAFA as a whole, and the mass action provision in particular,
is confusing.” 169 The source of this confusion stems from the unclear
language of the statutory triggering event—a proposal for joint trial of
common law or fact 170—and how broadly or narrowly federal courts
should construe their jurisdiction. 171
Congress also recognizes that mass actions have created confusion for
the courts. 172 Congress recently noted that the mass action section of
CAFA has led to unintended consequences because federal courts have

163. See, e.g., Glenn J. Pogust & Michael L. Gruver, CAFA Mass Actions: Can Plaintiffs
Continue to Game the System?, PRACTICAL L.J., Dec. 2013–Jan. 2014, at 57 (“In the years since
CAFA’s enactment, plaintiffs’ attorneys wishing to avoid federal jurisdiction under CAFA have
experimented with various approaches to keep their cases in potentially friendlier state courts.”).
164. Defendants may also have a statutory right of removal. See, e.g., Eufaula Drugs, Inc. v.
Tmesys, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 1240, 1241 (M.D. Ala. 2006) (“One statutory right of removal
provided to the defendant[ is] based on ‘complete’ diversity-of-citizenship jurisdiction. . . . Another
statutory right of removal exists under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005. . . .” (internal citations
omitted)).
165. Defendants must demonstrate that there would have been federal court jurisdiction initially
before invoking it on removal. See 2 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS, supra note 16, § 6:15.
166. Compare Parson v. Johnson & Johnson, 749 F.3d 879 (10th Cir. 2014), with In re Abbott
Labs., Inc., 698 F.3d 568 (7th Cir. 2012).
167. Lowery v. Ala. Power Co., 483 F.3d 1184, 1198 (11th Cir. 2007).
168. Lowery v. Honeywell Intern., Inc., 460 F. Supp. 2d 1288, 1293 (N.D. Ala. 2006).
169. Cooper v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 586 F. Supp. 2d 1312, 1314 (M.D. Fla. 2008).
170. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i) (2012).
171. See, e.g., Parson, 749 F.3d at 887–89 (construing the statute’s joint proposal language); In
re Abbott Labs., Inc., 698 F.3d at 572–73 (same); Tanoh v. Dow Chem. Co., 561 U.S. 945, 953 (9th
Cir. 2009) (same).
172. Class Actions Seven Years After the Class Action Fairness Act, supra note 146.
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not uniformly applied its preferred broad interpretation. 173 Litigants still
try to game the system by forum-shopping in both state and federal
court, and have been enabled to do so by a Circuit split. 174 Specifically,
Congress found that some federal courts have permitted “plaintiffs’
attorneys . . . to avoid CAFA’s requirements by splitting mass actions
into groups of 99 or fewer plaintiffs to avoid CAFA’s requirement that
mass actions with 100 or more plaintiffs be tried in Federal court.”175
This has led to forum-shopping in the federal courts, rather than state
courts, 176 and demonstrates that federal law has not been uniformly
applied as Congress intended. 177
C.

Federalism Concerns

In addition to creating confusion about how its language should be
interpreted in the courts, the mass action provisions also implicate
federalism concerns. Federalism is “the legal relationship and
distribution of power between the national and [state] governments.” 178
Federalism may require a federal court to refrain from hearing a
constitutional challenge to a state action if federal adjudication would be
considered an improper intrusion into the state’s right to enforce its own
laws in its own courts. 179 Mass actions thus create questions about
whether, as an empirical matter, federal and state courts are equally
“fair” to litigants or are equally competent to adjudicate matters that
come before them. 180 Although Congress appears to have been aware of
the federalism implications of CAFA by including carve-outs for cases

173. Id.
174. See id. (“One of the problems that has emerged since CAFA’s enactment is a new form of
forum shopping. Whereas prior to CAFA plaintiffs’ attorneys filed suit in what were perceived to be
the most favorable State courts, after CAFA it appears that attorneys are choosing to file class
actions in certain Federal appeals circuits due to a favorable circuit precedent. This is a troubling
trend considering that Federal law is supposed to be applied uniformly throughout the country.”).
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 687 (9th ed. 2009).
179. Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 723 (1996) (“Federal courts abstain out of
deference to the paramount interests of another sovereign, and the concern is with principles of
comity and federalism.”); see also RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., ET AL., HART & WECHSLER’S THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1049 (6th ed. 2009); Lynn N. Hughes, Floating Back
& Forth with Federalism: Removal and Remand for Proctors, 18 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 803, 803 (1996)
(“The friction of federalism is evident in the endless procedural haggling over which system of
courts is the correct place for a suit.”).
180. See, e.g., FALLON, JR. ET AL., supra note 179, at 278–83.
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of truly local concern, 181 the statute nonetheless profoundly reorganizes
the balance of power between the federal government and state
judiciaries. 182 In doing so, Congress did not hide its belief that state
courts were not up to the task of fairly and adequately adjudicating
aggregate litigation in their courtrooms. 183
D.

The Need for Clarity

While the mass action provisions are less understood, 184 they are
increasingly relevant as litigants turn to them to define the limits of the
statute’s jurisdiction. As commentators have noted, parties who seek to
avoid federal court jurisdiction have attempted to limit the number of
plaintiffs in a suit to stay below the numerosity threshold. 185 And
defendants continue to stretch the limits of the mass action definition to
secure federal court jurisdiction. 186 A series of Forbes articles, for
example, discussed the different approaches to mass action jurisdiction
that have emerged in the Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits. 187
One article noted that the key question was whether these courts were
“willing to look beyond the . . . plaintiffs’ literal statements and actions,
181. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii)(I) (2012).
182. The following cases are not removable to federal court under the mass action provision:
claims that arise from a single event in the state in which the action is filed or in a “contiguous”
state; the defendant moves to join the plaintiffs’ claims; the claims are asserted on behalf of the
general public; and claims that are consolidated for pre-trial purposes only. Id.
§ 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii)(I)–(IV).
183. See S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 5 (2005).
184. The mass action device is less understood than the class action device in part because it is
simply a newer device. As discussed throughout this Comment, it came into existence only with
CAFA’s passage in 2005. See, e.g., Cook & Larkin, supra note 151, at 11. In contrast, the class
action device evolved from bills of peace at common-law in seventeenth century England. See
ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., Representative Suits—1, in SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY: FIVE LECTURES
DELIVERED AT THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN 199, 200–01 (1950). In addition, the way courts have
described their experiences tackling the mass action provision also shows that the provision is less
well understood than the class action device. See supra Part II.
185. See 2 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS, supra note 16, § 6:17.
186. See In re Abbott Labs., Inc., 698 F.3d 568, 572–73 (7th Cir. 2012) (accepting defendant’s
argument that a motion for a bellwether trial is a proposal for a joint trial under CAFA).
187. Rich Samp, Ninth Circuit Endorses Gaming of Class Action Fairness Act and Creates
Circuit Split, FORBES (Sept. 26, 2013, 11:08 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/wlf/2013/09/26/
ninth-circuit-endorses-gaming-of-class-action-fairness-act-and-creates-circuit-split/; Rich Samp,
Plaintiffs’ Bar Effort to Game Class Action Fairness Act Expands to Tenth Circuit, FORBES (Oct.
31, 2013, 10:02 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/wlf/2013/10/31/plaintiffs-bar-effort-to-gameclass-action-fairness-act-expands-to-tenth-circuit/; Rich Samp, Eighth Circuit Ruling Deepens
Circuit Split on Class Action Fairness Act Circumvention Tactic, FORBES (Nov. 19, 2013, 1:54
PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/wlf/2013/11/19/eighth-circuit-ruling-deepens-circuit-split-onclass-action-fairness-act-circumvention-tactic/ [hereinafter Samp, Eighth Circuit Ruling].
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expose what they were really up to, and uphold Congress’s intent in
passing CAFA.” 188 And many lawyers have written pieces briefing
clients and other practitioners on developments in mass action
litigation, 189 to inform them about plaintiffs “manipulat[ing] their
lawsuits to circumvent CAFA jurisdiction.” 190 Thus, mass actions are
increasingly relevant, despite commentators’ assertions that they would
not be. 191 It is therefore important that the federal courts use a uniform
framework to construe their jurisdiction under the provision.
This Comment seeks to clarify how federal courts should do that
when presented with a purported mass action on removal. Part III
discusses federal court subject matter jurisdiction in general to
demonstrate that federal courts usually construe their jurisdiction
narrowly. It describes some instances, however, in which federal courts
will go beyond superficially examining the extent of their subject matter
jurisdiction in order to balance the rights of plaintiffs as masters of the
complaint and of defendants who are entitled to a statutory right of
removal.
III.

SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION IN THE FEDERAL
COURTS

The mass action question is, at bottom, jurisdictional. Litigants have
been testing the full expanse of that jurisdiction, and, in doing so, have
raised important questions about the boundaries between state and
federal courts; 192 between the courts’ role in interpreting the law and in

188. Samp, Eighth Circuit Ruling, supra note 187.
189. See, e.g., Pogust & Gruver, supra note 163, at 58.
190. Id.
191. But see 2 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS, supra note 16, § 6:24 (“Because mass actions tend
to occur in jurisdictions without class actions and cannot be called into being by a defendant’s
joinder motion, they do not arise that frequently.”).
192. Removal of a case from state to federal court necessarily implicates the relationship between
the state court and federal court systems. See Smallwood v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 385 F.3d 568, 576
(5th Cir. 2004) (“[O]ur insistence that diversity removal, powerful as it is, remain within its
congressionally marked traces is demanded by principles of comity and federalism—that a state
court is to be trusted to handle the suit unless the suit satisfies the removal requirements.”); Univ. of
S. Ala. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 411 (11th Cir. 1999) (“Because removal jurisdiction
raises significant federalism concerns, federal courts are directed to construe removal statutes
strictly.” (citing Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108–09 (1941))); In re
Facebook, Inc., IPO Sec. & Derivative Litig., 922 F. Supp. 2d 475, 480 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“Removal
statutes are to be ‘strictly construed . . . because removal of a case implicates significant federalism
concerns.’” (quoting In re NASDAQ Market Makers Antitrust Litig., 929 F. Supp. 174, 178
(S.D.N.Y. 1996))).

15 - Gitt_ Final Author Review_Approved 03.19.15.docx (Do Not Delete)

476

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

4/13/2015 11:57 AM

[Vol. 90:453

Congress’ ability to enact its will through legislation; 193 and between
plaintiffs’ role as masters of their complaints and defendants’ statutory
rights to a federal forum. 194 How federal courts should interpret and
confine their jurisdiction underlies all of these inquiries, so this
Comment next turns to subject matter jurisdiction in the federal courts.
A.

Carefully Bounding Subject Matter Jurisdiction

It is a maxim every first-year law student learns: Federal courts are
courts of limited subject matter jurisdiction. 195 Because of this
limitation, “[f]ederal courts are presumed not to have jurisdiction,” 196
and the presumption prevails because parallel systems of state and
national government co-exist in the United States’ federal system of
government. 197 Once the federal Constitution was enacted, federal courts
were only given jurisdiction over limited areas of law as set out in
Article III because of concern for existing state court systems. 198 In
193. See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 848 (1986) (“Article
III, § 1, serves both to protect ‘the role of the independent judiciary within the constitutional scheme
of tripartite government,’ and to safeguard litigants’ ‘right to have claims decided before judges
who are free from potential domination by other branches of government.’” (internal citations
omitted)).
194. A defendant may have a right to remove a case from state to federal court if it meets
statutory requirements created by Congress. See Eufaula Drugs, Inc. v. Tmesys, Inc., 432 F. Supp.
2d 1240, 1241 (M.D. Ala. 2006) (“One statutory right of removal provided to the defendant[ is]
based on ‘complete’ diversity-of-citizenship jurisdiction . . . . Another statutory right of removal
exists under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005.”) (internal citations omitted)); Feldman v. N.Y.
Life Ins. Co., No. CIV. A. 97-4684, 1998 WL 94800, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 4, 1998) (forbidding
plaintiffs to “manipulate federal jurisdiction and defeat the Defendant’s statutory right of removal”).
However, the plaintiff is the acknowledged “master of the complaint.” See Caterpillar Inc. v.
Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987) (noting in the federal question context that “the plaintiff [is] the
master of the claim; he or she may avoid federal jurisdiction by exclusive reliance on state law.”).
195. See, e.g., City of Milwaukee v. Illinois & Michigan, 451 U.S. 304, 312 (1981) (“Federal
courts, unlike state courts, are not general common-law courts . . . .”); Owen Equip. Erection Co. v.
Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 374 (1978) (“It is a fundamental precept that federal courts are courts of
limited jurisdiction.”).
196. 1 FEDERAL PROCEDURE, L.ED. § 1:12 (2013).
197. “Federal: Of or relating to a system of associated governments with a vertical division of
governments into national and regional components having different responsibilities.” BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY 685 (9th ed. 2009).
198. See South Carolina v. Regan, 465 U.S. 367, 396 (1984) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (“The
Framers obviously thought that the national government should have a judicial system of its own
and that that system should have a Supreme Court. However, because the Framers believed the State
courts would be adequate for resolving most disputes, they generally left Congress the power of
determining what cases, if any, should be channelled to the federal courts.”); Hulett v. McMain,
Civil Action No. 9:07cv223, 2008 WL 58971, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 2, 2008) (“If Congress has not
conferred jurisdiction upon the federal courts, the state courts become the sole vehicle for obtaining
initial review of some claims.”).
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addition, the Framers left the decision whether to establish “inferior”
tribunals to Congress—a body made up of individual legislators
representing states. 199 It is against this history and structure that all
questions of federal court jurisdiction must be examined.
Subject matter jurisdiction is not a purely academic matter because
“[w]ithout jurisdiction [a] court cannot proceed at all.” 200 Jurisdiction “is
power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function
remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the
cause.” 201 It is “inflexible and without exception.” 202 Whether a federal
court can hear a case involves complex questions of the relationship
between the federal government and the states, and of the relationship
between the three branches of federal government—executive,
legislative, and judicial.
It does not matter that the jurisdictional question is complex and more
difficult than a decision on the merits otherwise would be. In a
particularly striking example, a unanimous Supreme Court struck down
the doctrine of “hypothetical jurisdiction,” which had emerged in some
Circuit Courts of Appeals. 203 That doctrine allowed federal courts “to
proceed immediately to the merits question, despite jurisdictional
objections” when the merits question was easier to resolve and where the
party that prevailed on the merits was the same party that would prevail
if there was no jurisdiction.204 In this case, the Court was presented with
both a jurisdictional issue and a merits question about whether the
Emergency Planning and Community Right–To–Know Act of 1986
authorized a private enforcement action for “purely past violations.” 205
The Court held that jurisdictional questions are a threshold matter. 206
The Court “decline[d] to endorse [the hypothetical] approach because it
carries the courts beyond the bounds of authorized judicial action and
thus offends fundamental principles of separation of powers.” 207 It is
unsurprising, then, that federal courts carefully protect the boundaries of
their jurisdiction to ensure that they only adjudicate those matters
properly before them.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

See U.S. CONST. art. III.
Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1868).
Id.
Mansfield, C. & L.M. Ry. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382 (1884).
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83 (1998).
Id. at 93–94.
Id. at 86.
Id. at 94.
Id.
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There are many examples of federal courts—either through their own
construction or as directed by congressional mandate—construing their
subject matter jurisdiction narrowly to confine the expanse of their
power. For example, 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), a removal statute, requires
remand “[i]f at any time before final judgment it appears that the district
court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.” 208 It takes into account that
additional parties might be added and cause jurisdictional defects. 209
Once that happens, the court may either retain its jurisdiction by refusing
to permit the joinder that would destroy jurisdiction, or allow joinder and
then remand the case. 210 Congress does not direct the federal court to
continue with the case if the court does not have jurisdiction.
Similarly, the subject matter jurisdiction issue may be raised for the
first time on appeal, 211 which is exceptional in litigation. 212 It is best
explained by the insistence that federal courts act only when they have
subject matter jurisdiction. In American Fire & Casualty Company v.
Finn, 213 a defendant removed to federal court and, at that time, resisted
the plaintiff’s arguments that the federal court did not have subject
matter jurisdiction. 214 However, the defendant later raised lack of
jurisdiction as a ground for removal after the plaintiff won on the
merits. 215 The Supreme Court found this maneuvering permissible
because the federal court did not have the power to adjudicate a case
improperly removed from state court. 216 To have found otherwise
“would by the act of the parties work a wrongful extension of federal
jurisdiction and give district courts power the Congress has denied
them.” 217 Thus, these examples show that federal courts carefully police
208. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (2012).
209. Id.
210. Id. (“If after removal the plaintiff seeks to join additional defendants whose joinder would
destroy subject matter jurisdiction, the court may deny joinder, or permit joinder and remand the
action to the state court.”).
211. 13 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 32, § 3522.
212. Id.
213. 341 U.S. 6 (1951).
214. Id. at 8–9.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 18.
217. Id. However, where a jurisdictional defect is cured before the federal court notices the
defect, it may nonetheless enter final judgment, Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 76–77 (1996)
(“[N]o jurisdictional defect lingered through judgment in the District Court. To wipe out the
adjudication postjudgment . . . would impose an exorbitant cost on our dual court system.”), and a
federal court may rule on personal jurisdiction before it does so on subject matter jurisdiction,
Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 578 (1999) (“Customarily, a federal court first
resolves doubts about its jurisdiction over the subject matter, but there are circumstances in which a
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their own jurisdiction to comport with values inherent in our federal
system.
Diversity jurisdiction in particular requires federal courts to take
special care to ensure the boundaries of their jurisdiction are properly
drawn. Because diversity jurisdiction is an aggressive assertion of
federal power over ostensibly state issues, 218 federal courts sitting in
diversity employ a number of tools to deal with this tension and ensure
proper respect for state courts in the federal system. For example, they
may certify questions of state law to state courts to “build a cooperative
judicial federalism.” 219 They also attempt to construe state law as state
courts would because “[t]he task of a federal court in a diversity action is
to approximate state law as closely as possible in order to make sure that
the vindication of the state right is without discrimination because of the
federal forum.” 220 When presented with a novel question of state law on
which no state court has opined, the federal court will give the effect to
the law that it believes the state court would have. 221 In doing so, the
federal court uses “intermediate appellate court decisions, decisions
from other jurisdictions, statutes, treatises, and restatements as
guidance.” 222 These practices illustrate the concern federal courts have
with adequately addressing the tension between their jurisdiction and a
state’s prerogative to define and develop its own law.
B.

Beyond the Jurisdictional Pleadings

Tension between plaintiffs and defendants always exists no matter the
basis for subject matter jurisdiction. That is because the plaintiff is the

district court appropriately accords priority to a personal jurisdiction inquiry.”).
218. FALLON, JR., ET AL., supra note 179, at 1356.
219. Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 390–91 (1974). Judicial federalism is “the separation
of judicial authority between federal courts and state courts.” POLITICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF U.S.
STATES AND REGIONS 819 (2009) (Donald P. Haider-Markel ed., 2009).
220. Tate v. Trialco Scrap, Inc., 908 F.2d 974 (6th Cir. 1990) (“[W]e overturn a district court’s
conclusions on questions of state law only if they are ‘clearly wrong.’”); In re Air Crash Disaster
Near Chi., Ill. on May 25, 1979, 701 F.2d 1189, 1196 (7th Cir. 1983) (“Considered dicta of a state
supreme court must be given weight by a federal court in ascertaining state law . . . .”); Perkins v.
Bd. of Dir. of Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 13, 686 F.2d 49, 54 (1st Cir. 1982) (“[W]e should look to [state
court] statements as indicia of how the state’s highest court might decide.”); Gee v. Tenneco, Inc.,
615 F.2d 857, 861 (9th Cir. 1980) (“The court below, sitting as a federal district court in a diversity
action, was obliged to apply the substantive law of the state in which it sat . . . .”).
221. See Assurance Co. of Am. v. Wall & Assocs. LLC of Olympia, 379 F.3d 557, 560 (9th Cir.
2004) (“[W]hen interpreting state law, federal courts are bound by decisions of the state’s highest
court.” (quoting Nelson v. City of Irvine, 143 F.3d 1196, 1206 (9th Cir. 1998))).
222. Id.

15 - Gitt_ Final Author Review_Approved 03.19.15.docx (Do Not Delete)

480

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

4/13/2015 11:57 AM

[Vol. 90:453

master of the complaint, but the defendant may have a statutory right of
removal, assuming all of the requirements for jurisdiction are met, and
therefore also has some basis for directing the litigation. 223 The court
then must also grapple with this tension when it intersects with the
question of whether the court has subject matter jurisdiction. Federal
courts have not always been willing to engage in this inquiry, but they
started doing so in the modern era to balance these interests.
Because these tensions might have led courts to deviate from strictly
construing subject matter jurisdiction, federal courts in the 1800s
generally did not inquire into the litigants’ tactics when determining
whether they had subject matter jurisdiction. 224 The adherence to the
maxim that federal courts are courts of limited subject matter jurisdiction
was nearly absolute. 225 While this approach respected the powers of the
federal and state courts, it did not take into account other concerns. It
“ignore[d] the use of techniques that undermined a party’s legitimate
statutory right to choose a federal forum.” 226 Thus, the courts allowed
“activities by the state court plaintiff obviously undertaken solely to
prevent the federal courts from exercising diversity jurisdiction” through
removal. 227 In these instances, only state courts could address the effects
of such maneuvers because no federal forum was available.228 But this
rigidity has since been relaxed. 229
Federal courts are now interested in “the whims and tactical concerns
of the litigants” 230 when they construe their subject matter jurisdiction.
That is, federal courts realize that subject matter jurisdiction is so
important that they must—at least to some degree—investigate the
parties’ claims of subject matter jurisdiction, rather than disposing of
223. 13 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 32, § 3641 (3d ed. 2008) (“If the plaintiff’s preference is for a
state court, rather than a federal court, he or she simply may file suit in a state court. However, if
[all of the requirements for diversity jurisdiction are met], the defendant . . . may thwart the
plaintiff’s choice of a state forum by removing the suit to the federal court . . . .”).
224. See, e.g., Oakley v. Goodnow, 118 U.S. 43, 45 (1886) (stating that federal courts have “no
authority . . . to take jurisdiction of a case by removal from a state court when a colorable
assignment has been made to prevent such a removal”); 13 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 32, § 3641.
225. 13 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 32, § 3641.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. See Provident Sav. Life Assur. Soc. v. Ford, 114 U.S. 635, 641 (1885) (“[It would] be a
good defense to an action in a state court to show that a colorable assignment has been made to
deprive the United States court of jurisdiction; but . . . it would be a defense to the action, and not a
ground of removing that cause into the federal court.”).
229. 13 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 32, § 3641 (discussing the evolution of federal courts’
inquiring into whether there were efforts by a party to defeat federal jurisdiction).
230. Id.
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them on facial grounds in all instances. Doing so presents “the difficult
question of when following the complex rules of diversity jurisdiction
and removal crosses the line that divides permitted gamesmanship from
prohibited conduct.” 231 Federal courts therefore are willing and able to
investigate their jurisdiction in an effort to prevent gamesmanship that
would lead the court to adjudicate a matter that it does not truly have
jurisdiction over. It also does so when there are plausible allegations that
a plaintiff is undermining a defendant’s ostensibly legitimate right to a
federal forum. 232 To understand this, it is helpful to briefly discuss how
the courts analyze jurisdiction.
The party seeking federal court jurisdiction has the burden of proving
it by jurisdictional facts. 233 Jurisdiction may be attacked by either the
party opposing it or questioned by the court on facial or factual
grounds. 234 A facial inquiry into subject matter jurisdiction takes all
allegations asserting jurisdiction as true because it is the allegations that
are at issue, not a contention that jurisdiction cannot be proved. 235 In a
factual inquiry, however, the subject is the accuracy of the factual
allegations, and the parties must demonstrate facts showing
jurisdiction. 236 In doing so, the courts may consider the pleadings and
evidence outside of a complaint’s allegations submitted by the parties, 237
including affidavits, declarations, and testimonial evidence.238 The court
can even “conduct a limited evidentiary hearing if necessary.” 239
Further, because the court’s power to hear the case is at issue, the court

231. In re Avandia Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 07-MD-1871, MDL No.
1871, 2014 WL 2011597, at *1 (E.D. Pa. May 15, 2014).
232. See id.
233. See, e.g., Frederico v. Home Depot., 507 F.3d 188, 196 (3d Cir. 2007).
234. 5B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 32, § 1350.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. See, e.g., Leveski v. ITT Educ. Servs., Inc., 719 F.3d 818, 828 (7th Cir. 2013) (deposition
testimony); Harris v. Rand, 682 F.3d 846, 851 (9th Cir. 2012) (stating that “a district court may
require additional proof” of jurisdictional facts); Green v. United States, 630 F.3d 1245, 1248 n.3
(9th Cir. 2011) (“[P]roof of jurisdictional facts may be supplied by affidavit, declaration, or any
other evidence properly before the court . . . .”); Paper, Allied-Indus., Chem. & Energy Workers
Int’l Union v. Cont’l Carbon Co., 428 F.3d 1285, 1292–93 (10th Cir. 2005) (noting that a motion to
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction may take the form of either a facial or a factual attack
and that, on a factual attack, “the court must look beyond the complaint and has wide discretion to
allow documentary and even testimonial evidence”); 13 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 32, § 3641
(discussing the evolution of federal courts’ inquiring into whether there were efforts by a party to
defeat federal jurisdiction).
239. Smith v. Bd. of Trs. Lakeland Cmty. Coll., 746 F. Supp. 2d 877, 888 (N.D. Ohio 2010).
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is “entitled at any time sua sponte to delve into the issue of whether
there is a factual basis to support the . . . exercise of subject matter
jurisdiction.” 240 This burden must be met by a preponderance of the
evidence. 241
C.

Probing the Litigants’ Claims to Find Fraudulent Joinder

Despite the fundamental concern with construing subject matter
jurisdiction narrowly, federal courts attempt to balance competing
interests and therefore do not so narrowly construe their jurisdiction as
to ignore all other important litigation principles. Rather, federal courts
will pierce the parties’ pleadings to learn about the parties’ litigation
strategy. Fraudulent joinder is a particularly helpful guide in creating a
jurisdictional framework under the mass action provisions, discussed
infra.
Fraudulent joinder balances a plaintiff’s ability to plead around
federal court jurisdiction, 242 the defendant’s statutory right to removal, 243
and the power of the federal courts. 244 A common technique to ensure
240. Transatlantic Marine Claims Agency, Inc. v. Ace Shipping Corp., Div. of Ace Young Inc.,
109 F.3d 105, 108 (2d Cir. 1997); see also Watson v. Bretz & Coven LLP, No. 12 Civ. 1441 GBD
KNF, 2013 WL 765361, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2013) (“[T]he party invoking federal jurisdiction
must support the basis for jurisdiction alleged in its pleadings ‘with competent proof if a party
opposing jurisdiction . . . challenges [the allegation] or if the court sua sponte raises the question.’”
(quoting Linardos v. Fortuna, 157 F.3d 945, 947 (2d Cir. 1998))); Somboonmee v. Holder,
3:100V167/MCR/EMT, 2011 WL 3625674, at *2 (N.D. Fla. July 18, 2011) (“[A] federal court is
obligated to inquire into subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte whenever it may be lacking.”); Cole
v. Martin, No. C-95-20373 RMW, 1995 WL 396844, at *1 (N.D. Cal. June 28, 1995) (“[A] district
court may review the complaint and dismiss sua sponte those claims premised on meritless legal
theories or that that clearly lack any factual basis.”).
241. See, e.g., Frederick v. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., 683 F.3d 1242, 1244 (10th Cir. 2012)
(stating a defendant seeking removal under CAFA’s class action provisions must establish the
amount in controversy by a preponderance of the evidence); Bell v. Hershey Co., 557 F.3d 953, 958
(8th Cir. 2009) (“[A] party seeking to remove under CAFA must establish the amount in
controversy by a preponderance of the evidence. . . .”); Guglielmino v. McKee Foods Corp., 506
F.3d 696, 701 (9th Cir. 2007) (applying “the preponderance of the evidence burden of proof to the
removing defendant”).
242. See Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987) (noting in the federal question
context that “the plaintiff [is] the master of the claim; he or she may avoid federal jurisdiction by
exclusive reliance on state law.”).
243. See Eufaula Drugs, Inc. v. Tmesys, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 1240, 1241 (M.D. Ala. 2006)
(“One statutory right of removal provided to the defendant [is] based on ‘complete’ diversity-ofcitizenship jurisdiction . . . . Another statutory right of removal exists under the Class Action
Fairness Act of 2005.” (internal citations omitted)); Feldman v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., No. CIV. A. 974684, 1998 WL 94800, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 4, 1998) (forbidding plaintiffs to “manipulate federal
jurisdiction and defeat the Defendant’s statutory right of removal”).
244. See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 848 (1986) (“Article
III, § 1, serves both to protect ‘the role of the independent judiciary within the constitutional scheme
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that there is no basis for diversity jurisdiction and therefore to prevent a
defendant from removing the state court suit to federal court is “to join a
party whose presence in the case creates the prohibited cocitizenship on
both sides of the litigation.” 245 Federal courts developed the fraudulent
joinder doctrine to root out gamesmanship that would go too far in the
direction of destroying diversity jurisdiction. 246 Indeed, pleading to
avoid diversity jurisdiction—including under CAFA—“is permitted with
some limitations; for example, the joinder must not be fraudulent.” 247 It
allows the federal court to inquire into the substantive or legal basis for a
plaintiff’s claim if there are allegations that a party has been
“fraudulently” joined to prevent diversity jurisdiction. 248 However, the
removing defendant need not show that “the joinder of a nondiverse
party was motivated primarily by a desire to remain in state court or to
prove that the state court plaintiff’s conduct constituted fraud in some
legal sense.” 249 But the defendant must show that there is no colorable
basis for the plaintiff’s joinder. 250
The doctrine came into existence in the early 1900s to respond to
“attempts to wrongfully deprive parties entitled to sue in the Federal
Courts of the protection of their rights in those tribunals.” 251 Under the
fraudulent joinder doctrine, the question is whether the plaintiff had a
reasonable basis for the claim against the non-diverse party: “A
defendant is fraudulently joined ‘where there is no reasonable basis in
fact or colorable ground supporting the claim against the joined
defendant’ or where there is ‘no real intention in good faith to prosecute
the action against the defendant or seek a joint judgment.’” 252 A federal
court faced with the specter of fraudulent joinder “may look only to the
contents of the pleadings or the court may choose to look ‘beyond the
pleadings’ or to what has been referred to in some judicial opinions as
summary-judgment-type evidence, as many district judges have chosen
of tripartite government,’ and to safeguard litigants’ ‘right to have claims decided before judges
who are free from potential domination by other branches of government.’” (internal citations
omitted)).
245. 13F WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 32, § 3641.1.
246. Id.
247. In re Avandia Marketing, Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 07-MD-1871, 2014 WL
2011597, at *1 (E.D. Pa. May 15, 2014).
248. 13F WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 32, § 3641.1.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Ala. Great S. Ry. Co. v. Thompson, 200 U.S. 206, 128 (1906).
252. In re Avandia, 2014 WL 2011597, at *3 (quoting Boyer v. Snap-on Tools Corp., 913 F.2d
108, 111 (3d Cir. 1990)).
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to do.” 253 Thus, the federal courts may engage in either a facial or factual
inquiry. When courts do the latter, however, they are careful to note that
they should not “pre-try the merits of the case.” 254
Thus, federal courts, while concerned with the proper limits of their
subject matter jurisdiction, sometimes balance that consideration with
the litigants’ strategies. In that balancing, they will go beyond the
pleadings and find out what the litigants’ strategy is, even though it may
require extra administration on the courts’ part. It is important to the
administration of the federal court system because it preserves the
narrowness of the federal courts’ jurisdiction as the federal structure
contemplates, but it also facilitates Congress’ decision to extend
diversity jurisdiction to both plaintiffs and defendants. While some
commentators have asserted that CAFA ends the problem of fraudulent
joinder in mass and class actions, 255 the framework in those cases
endures in the mass action context as a helpful example of how federal
courts should analyze their jurisdiction when presented with allegations
that plaintiffs are gaming diversity jurisdiction. This Comment next
turns to that framework.
IV.

MASS ACTIONS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS

Congress extended subject matter jurisdiction to certain aggregate
state court litigation when it enacted CAFA’s mass action section. 256
Situated within the federal diversity statute, litigants—both plaintiffs and
defendants— have used the mass action provisions to test the boundaries
of federal court jurisdiction. 257 Their litigation implicates to what extent
plaintiffs may structure their suits to keep them in state court and how
the plaintiffs’ procedural maneuvers in state court should be analyzed in
determining whether there is federal court jurisdiction upon removal.
Three considerations therefore are central to defining the mass action
provisions’ contours: (1) the proper scope of federal court jurisdiction;
(2) which forum litigants may invoke—state or federal; and (3) how
courts should effectuate Congress’ intent.

253. 13F WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 32, § 3641.1.
254. Id.
255. See id. (“Congress’ enactment of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 . . . will have the
effect of reducing the fraudulent joinder problem in class and mass actions.”).
256. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11) (2012).
257. See, e.g., Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics, __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 736, 741 (2014)
(addressing defendant’s argument that there are more than 100 real parties in interest when a state
sues under the parens patriae doctrine).
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The primary difficulty in interpreting the mass action provisions
concerns when a group of plaintiffs have proposed a joint trial for
common issues of law or fact. 258 That is because the federal courts have
employed different, and sometimes conflicting, approaches to determine
whether there has been such a proposal. 259 Indeed, it is difficult to draw
strict lines around the different interpretations, which further
demonstrates that there is a lack of interpretive coherence in the federal
courts’ mass action decisions. That lack of coherence has produced a
jumbled doctrine and done a disservice to litigants. It has enabled
creative attempts to circumvent or create federal court jurisdiction
because no guiding principle or analysis has been announced. This
Comment comprehensively identifies common threads in the federal
courts’ attempts so far to define their mass action jurisdiction and to
reconcile those threads with the 2014 Supreme Court decision on mass
action jurisdiction in parens patriae suits. With these fundamental
elements in place, the Comment then proposes a framework for
construing mass action jurisdiction.
A.

The Formalist Approach and the Expansive Approach

This Comment proposes that the federal courts’ interpretive
approaches to the mass action provisions can be defined in two ways: (1)
a formal view that is supported by taking the plaintiffs’ state court
procedural actions at face value and not inquiring into motives or
effects; and (2) an expansive view of federal court jurisdiction enabled
by piercing the parties’ pleadings and assessing the plaintiff’s litigation
strategy. In reality, the courts’ analyses are somewhat novel for each
mass action jurisdiction question, but these categories present an
analytically helpful starting point. This Part discusses some of the cases
falling within these approaches. In doing so, however, the Comment
highlights how the lack of coherence in the approaches makes it difficult
258. See, e.g., Corber v. Xanodyne Pharm., Inc., 771 F.3d 1218, 1222 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc)
(“The parties dispute only whether Plaintiffs’ petitions for coordination constitute proposals for the
cases ‘to be tried jointly’ under CAFA.”); Parson v. Johnson & Johnson, 749 F.3d 879, 886 (10th
Cir. 2014) (“[Defendants] . . . contended that jurisdiction was available under CAFA’s ‘mass action’
provision because . . . plaintiffs had proposed a joint trial of claims involving more than 100
plaintiffs.”); In re Abbott Labs., Inc., 698 F.3d 568, 570 (7th Cir. 2012) (“The parties petition us to
resolve two conflicting district court decisions and decide whether a motion to consolidate and
transfer related state court cases to one circuit court through trial constitutes a proposal to try the
cases jointly . . . .”); Tanoh v. Dow Chem. Co., 561 F.3d 945, 953 (9th Cir. 2009) (“By its plain
terms, § 1332(d)(11) therefore does not apply to plaintiffs’ claims in this case, as . . . neither the
parties nor the trial court has proposed consolidating the actions for trial.”).
259. See infra Part IV.A.
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to predict how the outcome of one case will influence a later case.
Congress stated that CAFA’s mass action provisions should be
construed broadly to sweep as many aggregate state court suits as
possible into federal court. 260 The Senate Report “explicitly encourages
courts to look past the labels used by the parties.” 261 Congress’
encouragement suggests that its preferred framework for determining
whether plaintiffs have proposed a joint trial is a broad one. 262 But
Congress’ view does not exist in a vacuum. It must be reconciled with
how federal courts interpret their subject matter jurisdiction. This is
increasingly important because, “[t]o evade federal jurisdiction, counsel
for mass actions commonly file multiple, identical state court actions,
each proposing to try the claims of fewer than 100 plaintiffs.” 263 As
mass action litigation is likely to become more prevalent,264 the need for
a coherent standard to assess jurisdiction becomes greater.
In general, some courts have narrowly construed their jurisdiction by
limiting their consideration of the proposal for joint trial to the plain
language of the plaintiffs’ motions, 265 and do not look at what the
underlying litigation strategy is. 266 Usually, the court will not find a
260. S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 5 (2005).
261. Guyon Knight, Note, The CAFA Mass Action Numerosity Requirement: Three Problems
with Counting to 100, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1875, 1894 (2010).
262. See, e.g., id.
263. Pogust & Gruver, supra note 163, at 58.
264. Because the class action device has been cut back to such a degree, litigants appear to be
using more creative attempts to achieve global settlement of large-scale torts and other kinds of
litigation. See, e.g., J. Maria Glover, Mass Litigation Governance in the Post-Class Action Era: The
Problems and Promise of Non-removable State Actions in Multi-District Litigation, 5 J. TORT L. 1,
2 (2014) (“In the world of mass litigation, claimants, judges, and attorneys alike remain on a quest
to achieve global peace of countless, but related, lawsuits. Yet the paradigmatic mechanism for
achieving this elusive goal—the class action device—has been more enfeebled than ever, both by
limitations inherent in the device itself and by limitations increasingly imposed by the courts.”);
accord Myriam Gilles & Anthony Sebok, Crowd-Classing Individual Arbitrations in a Post-Class
Action Era, 63 DEPAUL L. REV. 447, 457 (2014) (“Class action litigation is in decline.”) (citing Joel
S. Feldman, et al., Evidentiary and Burden of Proof Standards for Class Certification Rulings, 11
CLASS ACTION LITIG. REP. 536, 541 (2010)).
265. See Parson v. Johnson & Johnson, 749 F.3d 879, 885 (10th Cir. 2014) (cataloging the
plaintiffs’ pleadings in the separate actions, which expressly disclaimed federal jurisdiction and
consolidation for any purpose other than pre-trial activities, and which did not include more than
100 plaintiffs in any one suit); Tanoh v. Dow Chem. Co., 561 F.3d 945, 953 (9th Cir. 2009)
(rejecting defendants’ argument that there was a mass action because “Congress appears to have
foreseen the situation presented in this case and specifically decided the issue in plaintiffs’ favor”).
266. Parson, 749 F.3d at 886 (“At the outset, we note that it seems clear that the plaintiffs’ choice
to file separate suits, each containing fewer than 100 plaintiffs, cannot simply be disregarded as
procedural gamesmanship and their ‘civil action’ summarily treated as a single one containing 650
plaintiffs.”); Tanoh, 561 F.3d at 953 (“Relying on both the Act’s legislative history and two recent,
out-of-circuit decisions interpreting a separate provision of the Act, Dow urges us to conclude that
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removable mass action. 267 Other courts have probed the plaintiffs’
pleadings to determine whether the suits were originally brought as
individual suits to avoid federal court jurisdiction.268 When engaging in
this inquiry, courts will usually find that they have subject matter
jurisdiction over the mass action. 269 The rest of this Part addresses the
two approaches.
1.

The Formal Approach

Some federal courts will not look beyond the face of the plaintiffs’
motion in state court and therefore will not find a mass action. The court
will not impute to the plaintiffs intent to propose a joint trial where one
is not clear. 270 (And, in one instance, a court seemed not to find a
proposal because the plaintiffs did not use the explicit language “propose
to try claims jointly.” 271) The court does not look at what effect the
motion will actually have in state court nor does it investigate further
whether plaintiffs have pled their cases in this particular way to avoid
federal court jurisdiction.
In Tanoh v. Dow Chemical, 272 the defendants who removed the
purported mass action argued that the plaintiffs had strategically
structured their state court complaints to avoid federal jurisdiction. 273
plaintiffs’ seven actions, viewed together, constitute a single ‘mass action’ under CAFA. Dow’s
arguments are unpersuasive . . . .”).
267. Tanoh, 561 F.3d at 956 (“None of the seven state court actions removed to federal court by
Dow involves the claims of one hundred or more persons proposed to be tried jointly . . . .”); see
also Parson, 749 F.3d at 886.
268. See Atwell v. Bos. Scientific Corp., 740 F.3d 1160, 1163 (8th Cir. 2013) (“The answer to”
the question of whether plaintiffs proposed a joint trial “requires careful review of the proceedings
in the City of St. Louis Circuit Court.”); In re Abbott Labs., Inc., 698 F.3d 568, 572 (7th Cir. 2012)
(“[A] proposal for a joint trial can be implicit.”).
269. Atwell, 740 F.3d at 1166 (“We conclude that, at the time the cases were removed, the
motions for assignment to a single judge filed by the three plaintiff groups to the same state circuit
court, combined with plaintiffs’ candid explanation of their objectives, required denial of the
motions to remand.”); In re Abbott Labs., Inc., 698 F.3d at 573 (“Plaintiffs may not have explicitly
asked that their claims be tried jointly, but the language in their motion comes very close.”).
270. See Parson, 749 F.3d at 892 (collecting cases and determining that the court could not find a
mass action “solely because the plaintiffs filed multiple cases each containing fewer than 100
claims”); Tanoh, 561 F.3d at 953 (“By its plain terms, § 1332(d)(11) therefore does not apply to
plaintiffs’ claims in this case, as . . . neither the parties nor the trial court has proposed consolidating
the actions for trial.”).
271. See, e.g., Romo v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 731 F.3d 918, 926 (9th Cir. 2013) (Gould, J.,
dissenting) (“The majority apparently would require an explicit request for a joint trial . . . .”),
overruled by, Corber v. Xanodyne Pharm., Inc., 771 F.3d 1218 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc).
272. 561 F.3d 945 (9th Cir. 2009).
273. Id. at 953 (“Dow contends that allowing plaintiffs to ‘evade’ CAFA by ‘artificially
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The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit declined the defendants’
invitation to investigate the plaintiffs’ litigation strategy and find mass
action jurisdiction. 274 Instead, it determined it would look no further than
the statute’s “plain language,” 275 which it found “consistent with both
the well-established rule that plaintiffs, as masters of their complaint,
may choose their forum by selecting state over federal court and with the
equally well-established presumption against federal removal
jurisdiction.” 276
Similarly, defendants before the Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit argued that a mass action arose because the plaintiffs in eleven
separate actions had filed suit in the same court and before the same
judge. 277 The defendants’ theory was that filing all of the suits in the
same court before the same judge was a proposal for joint trial. 278 But
the Tenth Circuit found that
[n]one of the individual actions contained 100 or more plaintiffs.
Each of the actions included at least one . . . resident[ial]
plaintiff. Each complaint specifically disclaimed federal
question and federal diversity jurisdiction, and included
provisions that admitted the claims had been joined for the
purpose of pretrial discovery and proceedings but disclaimed
joinder for trial purposes. 279
Based on the face of the plaintiffs’ pleadings, the Tenth Circuit was
unwilling to go further and inquire into the plaintiffs’ litigation strategy
and find federal court jurisdiction. 280 It further noted that “plaintiffs’
choice to file separate suits . . . cannot simply be disregarded as
procedural gamesmanship.” 281 Therefore, where the requirements for
federal jurisdiction under the mass action provision were not apparent on
structur[ing]’ their lawsuits to avoid removal to federal court would be inconsistent with
congressional purpose.”).
274. Id.
275. Id. at 956.
276. Id. at 953. Although the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s 2013 decision in Romo,
731 F.3d 918 was overturned en banc, the court followed a similar approach when it was originally
presented with twenty-six cases pending in state court.
277. Parson v. Johnson & Johnson, 749 F.3d 879 (10th Cir. 2014).
278. Id. at 887 (“[T]he defendants urge us to disregard the plaintiffs’ express statement that they
have not joined their claims for trial. To hold otherwise, they claim, would be to exalt form over
substance, sanction procedural gamesmanship, and thwart the Congressional intent behind
CAFA.”).
279. Id.
280. Id. at 886.
281. Id.
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the face of the complaint, the court was unwilling to assert power over
the state court suits, or even to inquire further about its jurisdiction.
And, in Abrahamsen v. ConocoPhillips, Co. 282 the defendants argued
before the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit that there was a mass
action because there were four state court actions, which together totaled
123 former employees, contractors, families, and estates. 283 Again, the
court was unwilling to infer a mass action: “Despite the similarities of
their claims, Plaintiffs did not propose to try their claims jointly.”284
Like the Ninth Circuit, the Third Circuit said that its reading was
“consistent with the well-established rule of deference to plaintiffs’
choice of forum and the presumption against federal removal
jurisdiction.” 285
Another Ninth Circuit case illustrates the outer boundaries of the
formalist approach, 286 although it has since been overruled after an en
banc hearing. 287 In 2012, the court determined that a coordination
motion could not be construed as a proposal for joint trial because the
plaintiffs did not explicitly mention a joint trial in their motion.288 The
case involved twenty-six cases pending before the district court for
alleged injuries from use of propoxyphene, an ingredient in prescription
painkillers. 289 More than forty actions had been filed in California state
court at the time this question was presented to the Ninth Circuit. 290
Attorneys responsible for the pending state court actions petitioned the
California Judicial Council to establish a coordinated proceeding for all
of the California actions under California Code of Civil Procedure
section 404. 291 Section 404 allowed for coordination of “all of the
actions for all purposes,” but the court found that “the plaintiffs’ petition
for coordination stopped far short of proposing a joint trial.” 292 In their
submission to the California Judicial Council, the plaintiffs cited

282. 503 F. App’x 157 (3d Cir. 2012).
283. Id. at 159.
284. Id. at 160.
285. Id.
286. Romo v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 731 F.3d 918 (9th Cir. 2013).
287. Corber v. Xanodyne Pharm., Inc., 771 F.3d 1218 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc).
288. Romo, 731 F.3d at 922–23 (finding that “[o]ne would be hard pressed to parse a proposal for
a joint trial” from the language of plaintiffs’ coordination motion, even though plaintiffs moved for
coordination for “all purposes”).
289. Id. at 920.
290. Id.
291. Id. at 920–21.
292. Id. at 922.
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concerns about “a significant likelihood of duplicative discovery, waste
of judicial resources and possible inconsistent judicial rulings on legal
issues.” 293 The Ninth Circuit found that “one would be hard pressed to
parse a proposal for a joint trial from this language.” 294 This is the
starkest example of the formalist approach, although it is no longer
followed. 295
The decisions in these three Circuits have several things in common.
First, the courts were unwilling to inquire into the litigants’ strategies by
requiring anything from the parties beyond the pleadings. They relied on
the presumption against federal court jurisdiction as the basis for their
truncated inquiry. 296 But, in doing so, they failed to note that federal
courts sometimes engage in a more searching inquiry, even against the
backdrop of that presumption. The courts also stressed the importance of
the plaintiffs’ right to their preferred forum, 297 but did not mention
anything about the defendant’s right to statutory removal. They failed to
provide guidance as to what a proposal for a joint trial would be,
focusing little on Congress’ preferred broad interpretation of CAFA
jurisdiction. 298

293. Id. at 922–23.
294. Id. at 923.
295. See Corber v. Xanodyne Pharm., Inc., 771 F.3d 1218, 1220 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc)
(“Because we conclude that all of the CAFA requirements for a removable mass action are met
under the totality of the circumstances in these cases, we reverse the district court’s remand
orders.”). See infra Part V.B for discussion of how the effect of the state law or rule should factor
into the federal court’s assessment of whether a mass action has been created by the plaintiffs’
motion.
296. Abrahamsen v. ConocoPhillips, Co., 503 F. App’x 157, 160 (3d Cir. 2012) (stating that the
court’s decision not to construe a mass action was “consistent with the wellestablished . . . presumption against federal removal jurisdiction”); Tanoh v. Dow Chem. Co., 561
F.3d 945, 953 (9th Cir. 2009) (stating that the court’s decision not to find a mass action was
“consistent with . . . the well-established presumption against federal removal jurisdiction”).
297. Parson v. Johnson & Johnson, 749 F.3d 879, 887 (10th Cir. 2014) (summarizing plaintiffs’
argument that “[t]hey are masters of their complaint, which they deliberately structured to avoid
federal jurisdiction under CAFA”); Abrahamsen, 503 F. App’x at 160 (stating that the court’s
decision not to construe a mass action was “consistent with the well-established rule of deference to
plaintiffs’ choice of forum”); Tanoh, 561 F.3d at 953 (stating that the court’s decision not to
construe a mass action was “consistent with . . . the well-established rule that plaintiffs, as masters
of their complaint, may choose their forum by selecting state over federal court”).
298. Parson, 749 F.3d at 889–90 (discussing Congress’ intent in passing CAFA, but not
discussing how Congress said it wanted CAFA’s provisions to be interpreted); Abrahamsen, 503 F.
App’x at 159–60 (stating that CAFA’s text was plain and therefore not resorting to analyzing
congressional intent); Tanoh, 561 F.3d at 954 n.5 (stating that the Senate Report that accompanied
CAFA was “of minimal, if any, value in discerning congressional intent, as it was not before the
Senate at the time of CAFA’s enactment”).
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The Expansive Approach

Other courts, however, are willing to go beyond the face of the
plaintiffs’ pleadings and find federal court jurisdiction. Indeed, the
Seventh Circuit has determined that a proposal for a joint trial can be
made implicitly. 299 In In re Abbott Laboratories, Inc., 300 the Seventh
Circuit found that plaintiffs had attempted to thwart removal to federal
court by dividing their claims among multiple state court suits. 301 The
plaintiffs had filed ten state court consumer suits involving hundreds of
plaintiffs, and then filed a motion to consolidate their cases and transfer
them to one state circuit court, pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule
384. 302 The plaintiffs argued that this request was not a proposal for a
joint trial because they had asked for separate bellwether trials rather
than one full trial, and their motion did not address how the trials would
be adjudicated. 303 Thus, the face of the motion did not propose a joint
trial. 304
But it did not matter to the court that the plaintiffs did not explicitly
propose that the cases be tried jointly because the effect of their request
was the same as that of a joint trial. 305 What mattered to the court was
that although “plaintiffs may not have explicitly asked that their claims
be tried jointly . . . the language in their motion comes very close.” 306
Taking the approach that a court can imply subject matter jurisdiction
when plaintiffs are “very close” to proposing a joint trial necessarily
requires a court to look into what the effect of the plaintiff’s motion will
be.
The Eighth Circuit has also inferred a mass action by looking at the
effect of the plaintiffs’ litigation strategy. 307 In Atwell v. Boston
Scientific Corp., 308 the plaintiffs filed a motion asking for a single judge
299. In re Abbott Labs., Inc., 698 F.3d 568, 572 (7th Cir. 2012) (“[A] proposal for a joint trial can
be implicit.”).
300. Id. at 570.
301. Id. at 570–71.
302. Id.
303. Id. at 572 (“Plaintiffs argue that they did not propose a joint trial because their motion to
consolidate did not address how the trials of the various claims in the cases would be conducted,
other than proposing that they all take place in the Circuit Court of St. Clair County.”).
304. Id.
305. Id. at 573 (“Plaintiffs may not have explicitly asked that their claims be tried jointly, but the
language in their motion comes very close.”).
306. Id.
307. Atwell v. Bos. Scientific Corp., 740 F.3d 1160 (8th Cir. 2013).
308. Id.

15 - Gitt_ Final Author Review_Approved 03.19.15.docx (Do Not Delete)

492

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

4/13/2015 11:57 AM

[Vol. 90:453

to handle the cases. 309 To the court, this request was the same as
proposing a joint trial. 310 Although counsel “disavow[ed] a desire to
consolidate cases for trial,” counsel “nonetheless urged the state court to
assign the claims . . . to a single judge who could ‘handle these cases for
consistency of rulings, judicial economy, [and] administration of
justice.” 311 The court refused to take the plaintiffs’ claims at face
value, 312 instead finding a joint trial had been proposed because the
plaintiffs’ request would have had the same effect. 313
A couple of commonalities can be distilled from these Circuits’
treatment of mass actions. First, the courts looked at what effect the
plaintiffs’ actions would have—if it is largely the same as a proposal for
a joint trial, they will find a mass action has been created. 314 The Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit did not, however, look at what effect a
state court would give to the outcome of the state procedural maneuver
the plaintiffs used, and the Seventh Circuit did so in only a cursory
manner. 315 Neither court discussed the plaintiffs’ role as masters of their
complaints, 316 and, perhaps more surprisingly, neither court discussed
Congress’ stated desire for CAFA to be broadly construed, even though
the courts’ decisions reflect a more expansive view of mass action
jurisdiction.317
The practical effect of the two approaches emerges from these
309. Id. at 1161.
310. Id. at 1163–64 (“The [plaintiffs’] motion did not request a common assignment with other
transvaginal mesh plaintiffs, but plaintiffs . . . noted that the issues in the transvaginal mesh cases
‘raise the potential for conflicted rulings through the discovery and motion process.’ . . . . Both
groups [of plaintiffs] cited ‘avoiding conflicting pretrial rulings,’ ‘providing consistency in the
supervision of pretrial matters, and ‘judicial economy’ as reasons for the assignment.”).
311. Id. at 1165.
312. Id. at 1166.
313. Id.
314. In re Abbott Labs., Inc., 698 F.3d 568, 573 (7th Cir. 2012) (“Plaintiffs may not have
explicitly asked that their claims be tried jointly, but the language in their motion comes very
close.”); Atwell, 740 F.3d at 1166 (“We conclude that, at the time the cases were removed, the
motions for assignment to a single judge filed by the three plaintiff groups to the same state circuit
court, combined with plaintiffs’ candid explanation of their objectives, required denial of the
motions to remand.”).
315. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in In re Abbott Laboratories, did address how
the state law rule for consolidation may have played out in state court in making its determination
that there was a removable mass action, but at the end of the opinion and without citing any state
law. In re Abbott Labs., Inc., 698 F.3d at 573 (“In all likelihood, the [Illinois State] Supreme Court
would transfer these actions back to one of the judicial circuits in which the suits are currently
pending. As a result, plaintiffs’ motion to consolidate was sufficient to create a mass action.”).
316. See generally In re Abbott Labs., Inc., 698 F.3d 568; Atwell, 740 F.3d 1160.
317. See generally In re Abbott Labs., Inc., 698 F.3d 568; Atwell, 740 F.3d 1160.
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comparisons: The more formal approach will allow fewer state court
suits into federal court, while the expansive approach may allow more
state court cases to be defined as mass actions and to be removed to
federal court.
B.

The Supreme Court Looks at Mass Actions

In 2014, the Supreme Court issued an opinion in the only mass action
case that it has decided. 318 Based on the particular procedural argument
involved, however, the case likely has little relevance to mass action
cases that are not brought by state attorneys general as parens patriae
suits.
In Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., 319 the Supreme
Court decided a case involving a suit filed by Mississippi’s attorney
general against manufacturers, sellers, and distributors of LCD panels.320
The attorney general brought this suit in state court under the parens
patriae doctrine—which gives a government standing to bring a lawsuit
on behalf of its citizens 321—and alleged price-fixing in violation of state
law. 322 The defendants removed the case to federal court, arguing that,
even though there was ostensibly only one plaintiff in the case—the
State of Mississippi—the federal courts should look instead at how
many real parties in interest 323 there were. 324 Because those real parties
in interest were the residents of Mississippi, the defendants argued that
the 100-plaintiff threshold necessary to trigger CAFA’s mass action
provision was easily met. 325
In its unanimous opinion, the Court declined the defendants’
invitation. 326 Although the Court noted that in certain contexts federal
courts are required to “look behind the pleadings to ensure that parties
318. Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 736 (2014) is the
only mass action case decided by the Supreme Court at the date of this Comment’s publication.
319. Id.
320. Id. at 741.
321. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1221 (9th ed. 2009).
322. AU Optronics Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 740.
323. A real party in interest is a party “entitled under the substantive law to enforce the right sued
upon and who generally, but not necessarily, benefits from the action’s final outcome.” BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY 1232 (9th ed. 2009).
324. AU Optronics Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 741–42.
325. Id. at 742 (“Respondents argue that the [mass action] provision covers [parens patriae] suits
because ‘claims of 100 or more persons’ refers to ‘the persons to whom the claim belongs, i.e., the
real parties in interest to the claims,’ regardless of whether those persons are named or unnamed.”
(emphasis in original)).
326. Id. (summarizing respondents’ argument and stating that “[w]e disagree.”).
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are not improperly creating or destroying diversity jurisdiction,” 327
Congress did not intend a “background principle of analyzing the real
parties in interest to a suit” to be conducted in mass action cases.328
Critical to the Court’s decision was Congress’ use of the word “plaintiff”
in CAFA, rather than person. 329 Thus, the Court found that the
numerosity requirement can only be met by adding up all of the
plaintiffs, not merely any party who has some remote interest in the
litigation. 330 The Court was also concerned with the administrative
difficulties that would arise if federal courts had to inquire into whom
the real parties in interest were for each suit before it. 331
While this case might suggest that the Supreme Court would analyze
mass action jurisdiction using a narrow approach, much of the Court’s
analysis appears to be limited to the context of parens patriae suits. For
example, the Court noted that, in passing CAFA, Congress “focus[ed] on
the persons who are actually proposing to join together as named
plaintiffs in the suit.” 332 It therefore acknowledged that courts in mass
action cases would focus on who is involved in the lawsuit. 333 This
inquiry is distinct from the question of when plaintiffs have proposed a
joint trial and created a mass action on that ground.
But the Court also states that the mass action device is designed to
prevent some level of gamesmanship and that courts sometimes need to
look beyond pleadings. The Court described the “mass action provision”
as “function[ing] largely as a backstop to ensure that CAFA’s relaxed
jurisdictional rules for class actions cannot be evaded by a suit that
names a host of plaintiffs rather than using the class device.” 334 This
language suggests that the federal courts should look at what the
plaintiffs are actually proposing because the purpose of the mass action
provision is to prevent evasion by plaintiffs. In addition, the Court notes
that it has “interpreted the diversity jurisdiction statute to require courts
in certain contexts to look behind the pleadings to ensure that parties are

327. Id. at 745.
328. Id.
329. Id. at 743–44 (discussing how “plaintiffs” should be construed in the context of CAFA’s
text).
330. Id. at 744.
331. Id. (“We think it unlikely that Congress intended that federal district courts engage in these
unwieldy inquiries.”).
332. Id. at 746.
333. See id. (“Requiring district courts to pierce the pleadings to identify unnamed persons
interested in the suit would run afoul of [congressional] intent.” (emphasis added)).
334. Id. at 744.
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not improperly creating or destroying diversity jurisdiction.” 335 It then
specifically mentions doing so in the fraudulent joinder context.336 Even
though the Court did not construe the number of plaintiffs to be over 100
by looking beyond the face of the complaint to the number of real parties
in interest, it acknowledges that there are instances in which doing so is
appropriate. 337 Thus, the Court’s determination that only plaintiffs are to
be counted in a mass action case provides little guidance to determining
whether a joint trial has been proposed. The opinion does, however,
support the notion that federal courts should look at the actual proposal
to give it full effect.
V.

CONSTRUING MASS ACTION JURISDICTION

This Part lays out an approach for federal courts to employ when they
are presented with a question of whether they have subject matter
jurisdiction over a purported mass action. Given the increasing relevance
of such adjudication, the need for direction is clear. It is true that cases
involving CAFA are “necessarily fact-specific” because the court has “to
apply CAFA’s statutory principles to the particular jurisdictional facts
involved.” 338 However, the federal courts should employ some guiding
principles in a coherent framework when construing mass action
jurisdiction. This Comment therefore eschews the adoption of either a
narrow or a broad approach to construing mass action jurisdiction;
rather, it offers a new and more nuanced framework for determining
whether federal jurisdiction has been created.
This Comment proposes that courts look beyond the face of the
plaintiff’s pleadings to determine the effect of the joinder in state court
only when the removing defendant meets an initial burden of showing
that plaintiffs have engaged in jurisdiction-circumventing behavior. The
defendant would have to do so by affidavits and other evidence, which
would lead the federal court to engage in a factual analysis of its subject
matter jurisdiction. The court would then focus on the effect that the
state court would give to the plaintiffs’ procedural motion that has
arguably constituted a proposal for a joint trial, including presenting a
certified question to the state supreme court if it is unclear to the federal

335. Id. at 745.
336. Id. (“We have held, for example, that a plaintiff may not keep a case out of federal court by
fraudulently naming a nondiverse defendant.” (citing Wecker v. Nat’l Enamel & Stamping Co., 204
U.S. 176, 185–86 (1907))).
337. One such example is in the fraudulent joinder context. See id.
338. Parson v. Johnson & Johnson, 749 F.3d 879, 890 (10th Cir. 2014).
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court what that effect would be. This approach provides coherence and
guidance for federal courts’ jurisdictional inquiry. It also best balances
several values underlying the federal court system: the boundaries
between federal and state courts; the ability of plaintiffs to choose their
preferred forum; and defendants’ statutory rights of removal.
A.

Proposing a Joint Trial

The first step is to distill a workable definition of a proposal for a
joint trial by which the court can measure whether it has jurisdiction.
Existing case law does not provide that definition, so this Comment
proposes that it be interpreted as an affirmative action taken by plaintiffs
that effectively aggregates the state court suits such that they will be
resolved through the same proceeding. In short, two elements will have
to be satisfied: (1) that the plaintiffs take some action, and (2) that the
aggregation will lead to all of the state court cases being resolved
through the same proceeding. This definition evolves from cases that
have already grappled with determining what the statutory language
means, and creates a clear starting point for federal courts construing
their subject matter jurisdiction.
The first part of this definition requires that the plaintiffs affirmatively
do something to bring together the cases. This requirement is consistent
with existing case law and with CAFA’s prohibition on federal court
jurisdiction for mass actions created only by a defendant’s motion. For
example, in Abrahamsen, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals did not find
a mass action where four state court actions together totaled 123
plaintiffs. 339 The plaintiffs did not actually do anything in state court to
bring together the suits; instead, they merely filed four separate suits. 340
An affirmative action to bring lawsuits together could be filing a motion
for consolidation, 341 for example, or proposing a bellwether trial that
would likely result in settlement. 342
CAFA itself appears to call for this definition. It expressly forbids
federal court jurisdiction over a “mass action” created by a defendant’s
motion. 343 It contemplated that only plaintiffs—and perhaps state

339. Abrahamsen v. ConocoPhillips, 503 F. App’x 157, 159 (3d Cir. 2012).
340. Id.
341. See Corber v. Xanodyne Pharm., Inc., 771 F.3d 1218, 1218 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc).
342. See In re Abbott Labs., Inc., 698 F.3d 568, 570 (7th Cir. 2012).
343. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii)(II) (2012) (“[T]he term ‘mass action’ shall not include any
civil action in which . . . the claims are joined upon motion of a defendant.”).
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courts—could create a mass action.344 And by stating that plaintiffs must
“propose” a mass action, it seems to require an act by the plaintiffs, not
just that they bring into court any number of suits. 345 Rather, the
plaintiffs must later “propose”—that is, take some affirmative action—to
bring the suits together where they were once separate. Although it
remains unclear whether a state court may on its own create a removable
mass action, it seems that the most appropriate interpretation is that a
state court cannot itself create the mass action that a defendant may later
remove. The statute explicitly says that a mass action comes into
existence when the plaintiffs propose a joint trial. 346 Thus, Congress
seems to have thought that only plaintiffs could create a mass action, not
state courts or defendants, at least within the meaning of CAFA.
Existing case law also appears to recognize this. For example, in
Anderson v. Bayer 347 in the Seventh Circuit, Bayer removed several state
cases to federal court on the ground that they constituted a mass action.
Before removal, the plaintiffs had added a total of 111 plaintiffs to four
existing lawsuits, so that—after the addition—the first suit was
comprised of 100 plaintiffs, the second suit had five plaintiffs, the third
suit had forty-five plaintiffs, and the fourth suit had eighteen
plaintiffs. 348 On appeal, Bayer urged the court not to put “too much
weight on form.” 349 The court, however, did not follow Bayer’s
suggestion. It determined that the suits could be viewed as a mass action
only because the defendants proposed that they be tried jointly, not
because the plaintiffs did. 350 The court found that Bayer’s removal was
essentially a motion for consolidation, which does not trigger CAFA’s
mass action provision. 351 When plaintiffs do not take action to
consolidate cases or otherwise try cases jointly, there is no mass action,
even though the plaintiffs still may have structured their lawsuits to
avoid federal court jurisdiction.
The second part of this definition requires that the plaintiffs’
344. See id.
345. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i) (“[T]he term ‘mass action’ means any civil action . . . in
which monetary relief claims of 100 or more persons are proposed to be tried jointly on the ground
that the plaintiffs’ claims involve common questions of law or fact . . . .”).
346. Id.
347. 610 F.3d 390 (7th Cir. 2010).
348. Id. at 392.
349. Id. at 393.
350. Id. at 393–94 (“Bayer’s argument that these separate lawsuits be treated as one action is
tantamount to a request to consolidate them—a request that Congress has explicitly stated cannot
become a basis for removal as a mass action.”).
351. Id.
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“proposal” result in a full resolution of the joined cases because of the
proposed procedure. The statute itself says that a “joint trial” will trigger
the mass action provision, 352 but it should be the effect of the procedure,
rather than the form, that is important. This means that procedures for
disposing of all the cases—beyond just a trial—could satisfy this
requirement. A bellwether trial, for example, could constitute full
resolution of all of the cases. Thus, a joint trial should be interpreted as a
procedural device that brings together all of the cases in such a way that
they will be resolved together if it would have that effect in state court.
The Seventh Circuit in In Re Abbott Laboratories, Inc. concluded
similarly. 353 It will not be enough that there have been multiple similar
suits filed in state court. And because the court will be directed to look
for two things, it will have a coherent approach for doing so and not
have to devolve into saying that plaintiffs have done something “very
close” to what CAFA requires and thereby imply a mass action.
In sum, the federal courts should interpret CAFA’s statutory
requirement that plaintiffs propose a joint trial to create a mass action as
requiring an affirmative act by the plaintiffs that will lead to a full
resolution of the cases as a result of that procedure. CAFA’s plain
language supports this interpretation, as do parts of several mass action
cases already decided in federal court. Applying this interpretation to the
particular facts of a case would be the starting point for determining
federal court jurisdiction. If there has been no affirmative act by the
plaintiffs, the federal court’s inquiry will stop. If there has been, but the
procedure that the plaintiffs have affirmatively sought would not
feasibly lead to a full resolution of the case, the federal court’s inquiry
will also stop. Only when these two criteria are met will the federal court
go further in its inquiry and look to the effect of the state law. In taking
that next step, the court should look at the effects of the litigants’
strategy to determine whether it has subject matter jurisdiction.
B.

Giving Effect to the State Court Procedure

There is no mass action until the plaintiffs attempt to bring multiple
suits together in a way that would lead to their resolution. There are—
and will continue to be—easy jurisdictional questions about CAFA’s

352. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(1) (2012).
353. In re Abbott Labs., Inc., 698 F.3d 568, 573 (7th Cir. 2012) (stating that the plaintiffs motion
came “very close” to a proposal for a joint trial and determining that the Illinois State Supreme
Court likely would have “transfer[ed] these actions back to one of the judicial circuits in which the
suits [we]re currently pending”).
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mass action provisions that come before federal courts. Where that is the
case, the federal courts need go no further than the face of the pleadings
to discern whether they have jurisdiction. For example, when the
plaintiffs have taken no affirmative action or have taken action that
would not lead to complete resolution, a federal court would remand the
case to state court because it would not have subject matter
jurisdiction. 354
But where courts must go further in their inquiry, they should adhere
to the requirement that the removing party bear the burden of proving
federal court jurisdiction. 355 The court should require factual evidence—
either because the party that opposes jurisdiction has brought a factual
attack against federal court jurisdiction or on the federal court’s own
motion—that establishes or disproves its jurisdiction. 356
This approach fits well within established judicial inquiry because of
the highly fact-specific nature of the requirements for a proposal for a
joint trial. For example, information about what the plaintiffs said in
their motion or at a hearing in state court can provide insight into
whether the plaintiffs took affirmative action. Similarly, it will be
important to know the facts surrounding the motion. As described supra
in Part III, the federal courts are entitled to receive and weigh factual
evidence in assessing their subject matter jurisdiction. And, when
presented with tough mass action jurisdiction questions, the courts of
their own motion should require such evidence. Doing so will mitigate
against overly formalistic assessments of jurisdiction that interfere with
a defendant’s statutory right of removal and Congress’ intent to create a
federal forum for aggregated state court litigation. It will also enable a
court to broadly construe its federal court jurisdiction on a factual record

354. See, e.g., Anderson, 610 F.3d at 393.
355. See, e.g., Frederico v. Home Depot, 507 F.3d 188, 196 (3d Cir. 2007).
356. See, e.g., Transatlantic Marine Claims Agency, Inc. v. Ace Shipping Corp., Div. of Ace
Young Inc., 109 F.3d 105 (2d Cir. 1997); see also Watson v. Bretz & Coven LLP, No. 12 Civ.
1441(GBD)(KNF), 2013 WL 765361, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2013) (“[T]he party invoking federal
jurisdiction must support the basis for jurisdiction alleged in its pleadings ‘with competent proof if a
party opposing jurisdiction . . . challenges [the allegation] or if the court sua sponte raises the
question.’” (quoting Linardos v. Fortuna, 157 F.3d 945, 947 (2d Cir. 1998))); Somboonmee v.
Holder, No. 3:100V167/MCR/EMT, 2011 WL 3625674, at *2 (N.D. Fla. July 18, 2011) (“[A]
federal court is obligated to inquire into subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte whenever it may be
lacking.”); Cole v. Martin, No. C-95-20373 RMW, 1995 WL 396844, at *1 (N.D. Cal. June 28,
1995) (“[A] district court may review the complaint and dismiss sua sponte those claims premised
on meritless legal theories or that that clearly lack any factual basis.”).
Such facts could include information about how the appropriate state court addresses such
motions or facts gleaned about the plaintiffs’ litigation strategy, such as a plan to file a motion, but
attempt to use language to circumvent federal court jurisdiction.
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rather than based on how the aggregated litigation appears on the limited
pleadings before the court.
In assessing the defendant’s evidence of jurisdiction, the federal court
should give appropriate consideration to the effect of the state court
procedure. CAFA once again seems to require this outcome, 357 and
giving effect to state law is part of the well-developed doctrine federal
courts use when they construe their subject matter jurisdiction in
diversity cases. This inquiry should occur because the federal court’s
jurisdiction is triggered only when there is a proposal for joint trial in
state court, so the critical question will be what constitutes a joint trial in
the state court. To properly respect the balance between federal and state
courts, the federal court should give effect to how the state interprets its
rule. When it is unclear how the state interprets such a procedural
motion, the federal court should give the effect to the rule that it believes
the state court would, as the federal courts do in other diversity cases. 358
First, CAFA’s mass action provision states that a mass action will not
be created where “the claims have been consolidated solely for pretrial
proceedings.” 359 Some ostensibly identical state court procedural rules
allow consolidation only for pretrial purposes, while others allow for
consolidation through trial. For example, at least fifteen states have their
own version of a multi-district litigation (MDL) statute 360 that mirrors
the federal MDL statute. 361 But these statutes operate differently. For
instance, Texas’s statute only allows consolidation or coordination for
pretrial purposes, including summary judgment and other dispositive
motions. 362 It does not allow consolidation through trial. 363 Thus, if a
group of plaintiffs brought together multiple state court suits in Texas
357. See Infra Part IV.B.
358. See, e.g., Tate v. Trialco Scrap, Inc., No. 89-5837, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 11999, at *2 (6th
Cir. July 16, 1990) (“[W]e overturn a district court’s conclusions on questions of state law only if
they are ‘clearly wrong.’” (quoting Gee, 615 F.2d at 861 (9th Cir. 1980)); Gee v. Tenneco, Inc., 615
F.2d 857, 861 (9th Cir. 1980); In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chi., Ill. on May 25, 1979, 701 F.2d
1189, 1196 (7th Cir. 1983) (“Considered dicta of a state supreme court must be given weight by a
federal court in ascertaining state law . . . .”); Perkins v. Bd. of Dir. of Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 13,
686 F.2d 49, 54 (1st Cir. 1982) (“[W]e should look to [state court] statements as indicia of how the
state’s highest court might decide.”).
359. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii)(IV) (2012).
360. Yvette Ostolaza & Michelle Hartmann, Overview of Multidistrict Litigation Rules at the
State and Federal Level, 26 REV. LITIG. 47, 69–75 (2007) (discussing multidistrict litigation rules at
the state level).
361. Id.
362. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 74.161–164 (West, Westlaw through 2013 3d Called Sess. of
83rd Legis.); see also TEX. GOV’T CODE R. 13.
363. Id.
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via this statute, mass action jurisdiction would be improper because
there would be no proposal for a “joint trial.” 364 California, on the other
hand (discussed supra), allows consolidation for “all purposes” through
its statute. 365 Thus, the consolidated cases would be able to proceed
through trial. 366 Because state laws operate differently even if they
appear to have the same effect, Congress seems to have contemplated
that federal courts would take into account the effect of the state court
procedural rule when construing federal mass action jurisdiction.
Indeed, this is the approach that the Ninth Circuit seems to have
adopted in its en banc rehearing of Romo v. Teva Pharmaceutical. 367 In
that case, a group of attorneys for the forty separately filed actions in
turn filed a single action asking for a coordinated proceeding to be
established. 368 It specifically asked for the proceeding to be coordinated
“for all purposes.” 369 The parties disputed whether the coordination
petition was a proposal for a joint trial. 370 In construing the petition as
one for a joint trial in the rehearing, the Ninth Circuit looked to the
“factor-based test [in California’s Code of Civil Procedure] to determine
whether coordination [was] appropriate.” 371 The court also stated that
“[i]t is not clear whether the California Judicial Council would grant
coordination for less than ‘all purposes.’” 372 The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals recent en banc opinion supports the idea that federal courts
should look at how the state procedural law operates in construing the
plaintiffs’ proposal—especially because it recognizes that the state law
may not support finding a mass action in every instance. But where the
state law supports finding a joint trial—as California’s test did in this
case—the federal court should find a joint trial. The court should not, as
the Ninth Circuit correctly did not, make this determination without
looking at the effect of the state procedural law.
Second, federal courts have developed doctrines to guide when and
how they may go beyond the parties’ pleadings to construe their
jurisdiction. 373 As discussed earlier, federal courts may make factual
364.
365.
366.
367.
368.
369.
370.
371.
372.
373.

Id.
CAL. R. CIV. P. 404.
Id.
731 F.3d 918 (9th Cir. 2013).
Corber v. Xanodyne Pharm., Inc., 771 F.3d 1218, 1221 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc).
Id. at 1221–22.
Id.
Id. at 1223.
Id. at 1224.
See supra Part III (discussing federal court construction of subject matter jurisdiction).
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inquiries when they are assessing their subject matter jurisdiction, and
they may require certain kinds of evidence to do so. 374 Not only do
federal courts engage in this inquiry, one of the two CAFA jurisdiction
cases to come before the Supreme Court implicitly contemplates this
approach. 375 In Standard Fire v. Knowles, the Supreme Court noted that
the district court looked at Knowles’ affidavit stipulating to seek
damages below the amount in controversy. 376 And the district court
found from that evidence that the amount in controversy was below
$5 million only because the plaintiff had stipulated to it.377 Thus, this
approach is familiar to federal courts.
This approach may pose additional administrative burdens for already
over-worked federal courts. 378 However, the courts have tools to require
litigants to assist them in this administration. For example, district courts
could impose local court rules that require a brief statement of relevant
state procedural law when a defendant removes a purported mass action.
Even if, however, this approach does impose some additional work, that
may just be the trade-off required given the complexity of mass action
litigation. In AU Optronics, the Court determined that a court could not
construe parens patriae suits as having over 100 real parties in interest
because CAFA was concerned only with counting the number of
plaintiffs. 379 But the Court did not preclude federal courts from inquiring
beyond the face of the plaintiffs’ pleadings when they were presented
with a question of how many plaintiffs would be joined together.380 In
addition, the Court also recognized the doctrine of fraudulent joinder,
which directs federal courts to look beyond the face of the pleadings. 381
It is therefore not out of the ordinary for federal courts to probe further
than the face of pleadings in jurisdictional inquiries.
While the Supreme Court has found in the class action context that
giving effect to state procedural rules would be too onerous, it would be
unlikely to do so in the mass action context. In Shady Grove Orthopedic
Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 382 the Supreme Court did not allow
374. See id. (discussing same).
375. Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Knowles, __ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 1345, 1348–50 (2013).
376. Id.
377. Id.
378. See, e.g., Alexander Bickel, The Overworked Court, NEW REPUBLIC (Nov. 17, 2011),
http://www.newrepublic.com/book/review/the-overworked-court.
379. Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 736, 746 (2014).
380. Id.
381. Id. at 744; see also supra Part III (discussing fraudulent joinder doctrine).
382. 559 U.S. 393 (2010).
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federal courts to engage in the additional inquiry of whether “state and
federal rules conflict based on the subjective intentions of the state
legislature.” 383 It did not do so because it would create “an enterprise
destined to produce ‘confusion worse confounded.’” 384 Administrative
problems would become overwhelming for federal courts because the
courts “would have to discern, in every diversity case, the purpose
behind any putatively pre-empted state procedural rule, even if its text
squarely conflicts with federal law.” 385 But there is a key distinction
between this case and one involving a mass action: Shady Grove
concerned Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, 386 while mass action
cases concern the federal court’s statutory jurisdiction. Thus, we should
look not to administrative problems generated by an inquiry into
conflicting federal rules and state procedural rules, but into how the
federal courts typically construe their subject matter jurisdiction and
how they generally operate in diversity cases. As discussed earlier in
Part III, federal courts sitting in diversity may inquire into the parties’
litigation strategy to see whether they are improperly circumventing or
creating federal court jurisdiction. 387 Federal courts also—as a matter of
course—give effect to state law when adjudicating diversity suits. Thus,
this Comment proposes that the federal courts use these familiar tools
when confronted with difficult questions of mass action jurisdiction.
Doing so may cause some additional administrative burdens, but those
burdens may be necessary to properly respect the role of state courts in
the federal system and to balance the rights of plaintiffs and defendants.
CONCLUSION
Congress passed CAFA in 2005 to provide a federal forum for
aggregate litigation of “national importance.” In doing so, it created the
mass action, which had previously been solely a creature of state court.
Federal courts have had difficulty construing their subject matter
jurisdiction under CAFA’s mass action provisions. Some federal courts
have interpreted their mass action jurisdiction expansively, while others
have interpreted it narrowly. But there has been no principled approach.
This Comment takes the important step of proposing such an approach,
one that is rooted in traditional constructions of federal court subject
383.
384.
385.
386.
387.

Id. at 404.
Id. (quoting Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941)).
Id.
Id.
See supra Part III.C.
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matter jurisdiction. First, it proposed that the federal courts uniformly
interpret the proposal for a joint trial to require some affirmative
procedural act by the state court plaintiffs that would lead to the final
disposition of the newly aggregated cases. The federal court would then
pierce the parties’ pleadings if the court’s subject matter jurisdiction was
not clear on the face of the pleadings, giving the same effect to the
underlying state court procedural mechanism that the state court would.
This proposal provides stability for both litigants and the courts, and
balances a number of important judicial principles, primarily that federal
courts are courts of limited subject matter jurisdiction and the right of
the plaintiff to choose the forum and the defendant’s statutory right of
federal jurisdiction.
The need for a coherent and principled framework is not merely
academic. Given that litigants are routinely invoking or trying to avoid
mass action jurisdiction, it is time for the federal courts to provide a
consistent framework for working with this thorny jurisdictional issue.

